SPECIAL
COLLECTIONS
DOUGLAS
LIBRARY

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY
AT KINGSTON

KINGSTON ONTARIO CANADA

A

PLAIN REPLY.

Printed by C. Roworth,
Bell Yard, Fleet Street.

A

PLAIN REPLY

TO THE PAMPHLET

CALLING ITSELF

A PLAIN ANSWER:

BEING

A MORE FAIR STATE OF THE QUESTION

BETWEEN

THE LATE AND THE PRESENT MINISTERS.

[by Bisset Robert]

Suum cuique.
Give every Man his due. Old Prov.

No species of falsehood is so certain of passing current upon the world, as that which has some degree of truth (however slight) for its foundation: and the misrepresentation of this transaction, however gross, appears to be the misrepresentation of a person, who had the means (though certainly little of the inclination,) of stating its circumstances, with correctness and precision. *Plain Answer*, p. 23.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR;

AND SOLD BY HATCHARD, PICCADILLY; EGERTON, WHITEHALL; AND RICHARDSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.

1804.

AC911.1884.B59

A

PLAIN REPLY, &c.

THE public attention has of late been forcibly engaged by the publication of two pamphlets, each of them profeſſing to review, with impartiality, the preſent ſtate of parties in this kingdom; and more particularly the ſituation in which the late and preſent miniſters appear to ſtand towards each other. If we only conſidered the intereſt which every man muſt neceſſarily feel in the government under which he lives, and by which he is protected; we muſt not wonder that the nation ſhould receive, with great eagerneſs, every detail of particulars, bearing in any degree the appearance of authenticity, reſpecting the individual members by which it is adminiſtered. But there are circumſtances of a moſt peculiar nature, which combine to render every particle of information upon that ſubject, moſt extraordinarily intereſt-

ing at this moment. The preſent times are eventful beyond all compariſon. The conteſt in which we are engaged is infinitely more important than any which has ever occurred, at leaſt ſince the civilization of Europe, under the mild ſpirit of Chriſtianity, has preſcribed limits generally received to the miſeries of war, and the ſpirit of conqueſt. There are alſo circumſtances of a private nature, which might ſerve moſt powerfully to excite curioſity. The change of miniſters which took place ſomewhat leſs than three years ago, has hitherto remained, to a certain degree, involved in myſtery. It was perfectly a new thing, that men, who went out of office, and, as it appeared, not entirely with their own good-will, ſhould agree, and unreſervedly profeſs to ſupport their ſucceſſors. When afterwards that ſupport was withdrawn at various times, and under various, and even diſcordant pretences, by the different members of the old adminiſtration; when it was alſo known, that overtures had been made for the return into office of that individual of them, in whoſe abilities the nation had been uſed moſt particularly to confide, and that he had refuſed to accede to what appeared to be the wiſhes of the great body of the people, as well as of his own moſt intimate friends and former aſſociates; it cannot but be ſuppoſed, that much anxiety would

would be felt on all ſides, to aſcertain the cauſes and progreſs of events, at once ſo ſingular and important.

This is what was profeſſed to be done by the reſpective authors of the two pamphlets above referred to: by one of them, indeed, more particularly as a volunteer, and as ſeeking, in the firſt inſtance, to convey material information: by the other, rather as preſſed into the ſervice, and only coming forward to correct what he aſſumed to be miſrepreſentation and calumny. Both theſe gentlemen profeſs to ſpeak from ſomething like authority; but this is not true in an equal degree of both. For it is moſt certain, and it is now admitted even by Mr. Pitt's friends, that Mr. Addington not only never ſaw the "Curſory Remarks," before they came out, not only never had an intimation of their being written, but that, for a long time after their publication, he was entirely at a loſs in his conjectures reſpecting the author.* On the other hand,

* It is neceſſary here to take notice of the impudent calumnies which have been propagated, for the purpoſe of making the world believe, that Mr. Addington countenanced this attack upon Mr. Pitt. It has been confidently aſſerted in the firſt place, that ſeven hundred copies (the very number was mentioned) had been circulated under Treaſury franks. This

hand, it is notorious, and even acknowledged, that the " Plain Anſwer," was not only written by a near friend, or rather (for, I believe, it is in ſome degree a joint production) by near friends of Mr. Pitt, but was actually reviſed by him.

is (and is now known to be) an abſolute falſehood, without the ſlighteſt foundation. If any thing did take place of the ſort, now again aſſerted by this gentleman, I will venture to ſay it could only be as to one or two copies ſent to very particular friends. Beat out of this, the ſame libeller (Mr. William Cobbett) has gone on to ſay, that Mr. Hiley Addington, accompanied by his nephew, " repeatedly called at Hatchard's ſhop, and inquired how the pamphlet ſold."—Now, after all this particularity of ſtatement, will it be believed that this alſo is a direct falſehood? Hatchard will teſtify that no ſuch enquiries were ever made. Of courſe, it is hardly neceſſary after this, to take notice of the reaſoning of the Anti-Jacobin Reviewer for December, who has (after a miſerable ſneer, utterly unworthy of gentlemen who profeſs to watch over the public taſte,) argued upon another falſe fact; for, after the beſt inquiry I have been able to make, I underſtand that the writer in queſtion is not in the pay of the treaſury.

May I not now aſk, if it be not unworthy of the authors of the " Plain Anſwer" not only to countenance theſe reports, but even to argue upon them. See p. 2 and 3, and p. 71. Theſe gentlemen muſt have had the means of knowing better. Obſerve too the guarded aſſertions, or rather inſinuations, of Mr. Charles Ward, in the pamphlet above referred to.

Sent

Sent out as it was into the world, for the avowed purpoſe of detecting and expoſing falſehood, the public had a right to expect from it the moſt clear, nay, and the moſt fair, ſtatement. What then ſhall be ſaid, if we find the account (as upon examination I think it will be found) to be not only as to ſeveral points wholly vague and unſatisfactory, but in others actually at variance with itſelf?

It is true, indeed, that between the "Near Obſerver," and the "More Accurate Obſerver," there are not many facts in diſpute. The difference, I conceive, will lie principally in the colouring which is given to every tranſaction; in the manner in which the picture is charged on the one ſide and on the other, and the different lights in which the ſame objects are viewed by the reſpective parties.

This is not to be wondered at; for the two pamphlets manifeſtly appear to be written with directly oppoſite ſentiments. The firſt (as it was ſaid, and appears extremely probable) was dictated by motives of perſonal animoſity, againſt Mr. Pitt.* The other is the production of men, decidedly connected with that gentleman, and profeſſing to be his friends. Of courſe, it was

* See Cobbett's Regiſter.

not

not likely that they ſhould often agree, even in the repreſentation of facts, where thoſe facts were eſſentially material to the queſtion.

The intention of the preſent ſheets is, from the facts advanced, or rather the admiſſions made by both parties, with ſuch correctives, as the author's perſonal knowledge and obſervation can furniſh, to extract a more true ſtate of the caſe, than has yet been preſented to the public. If more attention is paid to the correction of the miſtatements contained in the "Plain Anſwer," the reaſon muſt be obvious. It is not only the laſt, but the moſt authentic publication; it has, or ſhould have, corrected what is falſely alleged in the "Curſory Remarks;" if it has, therefore, itſelf, been incorrect, it muſt be conſidered as calling moſt loudly for correction.

Indeed this is become more immediately proper and neceſſary to be done, becauſe the queſtion has now aſſumed a more important ſhape. It is no longer a matter of mere curioſity upon a few circumſtances of private concernment. It now appears to involve the neareſt intereſts of the country. It is become a ſubject of ſerious inquiry, whether we are properly governed; and, ſtrange to tell, the fitneſs and the capacity of the preſent miniſters to carry on public affairs, is openly diſputed and denied by thoſe

thoſe very perſons who profeſs to have been the means of placing them in their preſent ſituations.

To this, therefore, as to the moſt important point, my obſervations will be principally directed. I wiſh not to pry into the private correſpondence or communications between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington. The latter gentleman, if I am rightly informed, has ſhewn a reſerve upon thoſe topics, which has been lamented by ſome of his friends. Whether this be politic or not, it is not neceſſary to decide: but I am perſuaded that no honourable mind will condemn, if it do not entirely approve, the feelings out of which that reſerve has grown.

Whatever, indeed, may be the cloud which may yet hang over any of theſe circumſtances, it does not appear as if any the moſt anxious friends of Mr. Addington, have any great cauſe of alarm, when they obſerve ſo many men of the moſt acknowledged honour and diſcernment, originally the neareſt and firmeſt friends of Mr. Pitt, all united in acknowledging the liberality and delicacy of Mr. Addington towards that gentleman. The public, indeed, may not be ſo eaſily ſatisfied; it may wiſh for clearer information. Luckily, as it appears to me, the ſeveral facts ſtated in the "Plain Anſwer," when properly

properly ſifted and examined, will go near to furniſh ſufficient grounds upon which to form a tolerably correct judgment even upon theſe points. But, after all, the general queſtion, upon the broad ground of the ability or incapacity of Miniſters, is that in which the Public is more properly intereſted.

The points in diſpute are ſtated with more preciſion and diſtinctneſs in the "Plain Anſwer," than in the other Pamphlet: and as the order of diviſion which is there obſerved appears to me to be convenient, I ſhall, in the firſt inſtance, at leaſt, adhere to it.

The grounds on which is reſted the attack made upon the characters of Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham, (and the ſame points are intimately connected with the juſtification of Mr. Addington) are there ſtated to be "The time, the manner, and the occaſion of "their quitting their official ſituations; the pro-"miſe given and withdrawn of conſtant, active, "and zealous ſupport; the circumſtances of the "Negociation for the return of Mr. Pitt into "office; and the general conduct of thoſe per-"ſons in Parliament."

Before I go into a particular examination of theſe points, I muſt, however, enter a ſort of proteſt as to the manner in which thoſe perſons are joined together; if, at leaſt, by ſuch union

upon

upon paper, it is meant to be implied that they ſtand upon the ſame grounds, and are to be ſupported by the ſame arguments. In great meaſure, as will be ſeen, their caſes are extremely diſtinct from each other, and claim a ſeparate conſideration.

As to the firſt point however, we may in ſome ſort conſider them as entitled to join in their defence or apology. They certainly went out of office together, and for all that we are told, upon the ſame grounds. We have however had hints that there were then exiſting between them differences of opinion upon material points: the ſame probably which ſubſequent events have diſcloſed, and brought into notice.

The truth is, and it is ſufficiently notorious, that the late Cabinet were always much divided in opinion, and that upon great and leading points. I believe too that theſe diviſions have been among the chief *pre-diſpoſing* cauſes of the late change. They may have had their operation upon the ſeveral members, even without their being perfectly ſenſible of it. And perhaps it is hence, that has in great meaſure ariſen the myſtery which has been ſuffered to hang over their reſignation.* But, however, ſince it is their choice,

* What I allude to, is the variety of opinion which is underſtood to have exiſted in their plans for carrying on the war.

choice, and that of their friends, to rely upon what is called the Catholic Queſtion, I will firſt examine it upon their own grounds, and I will do it the more readily, becauſe, ſo treated, it will contribute materially to the forming of our judgment upon that part of the Queſtion in which, as I have ſaid before, the Public is principally concerned, that is, the comparative merits and talents of the late and preſent Miniſtry.

I do not find that either by the "near Obſerver," or the "more accurate Obſerver," much ſtreſs has been laid upon the intrinſic merit or propriety of the Queſtion itſelf. I know not if the intereſts of the Church, and of the State, as intimately connected with it, might be conſidered by thoſe Gentlemen as properly ſubordinate, and only material as they might affect the characters of the reſpective Gentlemen whoſe cauſe they have eſpouſed. But, I apprehend, that to any unprejudiced man it muſt appear of the firſt conſequence, for thoſe who would juſtify the reſignation of Mr. Pitt and his Colleagues, to ſhew that

It has been commonly ſaid, that one man was for expeditions againſt foreign ſettlements, another was more partial to attacks nearer home; one was for holding high language to foreign powers, another for ſhewing a more pacific countenance.

the

the meaſure to which they clung with ſuch pertinacity, was not only not open to blame in itſelf, but of great and undoubted utility. I mean to ſay, and I aver as a general propoſition, that the man who makes the adoption of any particular meaſure the poſitive and fixed condition of his remaining in office, is bound to ſhew, in the firſt inſtance, that the meaſure was wiſe and good. It is not ſufficient (I mean not for his juſtification as a Stateſman) that he ſhould think ſo: he muſt be certain, morally certain, of it: and I ſhall ſhew by and by that Mr. Pitt, at leaſt, had abundant reaſon to be diſtruſtful of his opinion upon the ſubject.

But this obligation, ſuch as I have ſtated it, becomes inconceivably more ſtrong and more binding, if the time when ſuch a ſtipulation is made, be ſo critical and ſo big with danger, that the ſervices of the individual ſo ſtipulating are particularly wanted, and cannot, with perfect ſafety to the State, be diſpenſed with. Now it ſeems to be agreed on all hands, that ſuch was the criſis when this event took place. It is then eſſential for thoſe who would defend the character of Mr. Pitt, not only in point of integrity, but of wiſdom and ability; ſtill more for thoſe who repreſent him as poſſeſſed of the only talents which can ſave the Nation, to ſhew that the mea-

ſure which he ſo preſſed, as even to put the Country to ſuch imminent hazard, was not only wiſe in itſelf, but that it was wiſe to bring it forward at that moment, and wiſe to retain it, and to urge it under all the circumſtances, and with all the obſtinacy which I have ſtated.

This, however, is a queſtion completely declined by the Apologiſt of Mr. Pitt. "Of the "eſſential importance of the Queſtion itſelf," ſays he, "and of the nature and tendency of the "circumſtances attending the diſcuſſion, the "Miniſters were to judge for themſelves."*

Were they ſo? I grant that every man muſt judge for himſelf, nay, muſt act upon his own judgment; but if that judgment be wrong, and in a public matter, he muſt ſubmit to be told of it. I will add, that this is ſtrange language to be held in an Appeal profeſſedly made to the Public. I will aſk, what title have men who thus wrap themſelves up in their own opinions, ſo furiouſly and acrimonioufly to criticiſe and to reprobate the actions and ſentiments of others? What right have Lord Grenville, or Mr. Pitt, or Mr. Pitt's adherents, to beſtow ſuch epithets upon the preſent Miniſters, while they decline to give an account of their own conduct? We are alſo

* Plain Anſwer, p. 8.

given

given to underſtand, in the ſame ſtrain of myſtery, and certainly not very conſiſtently with the declarations in Parliament of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, or indeed the repreſentation given of them in this very Pamphlet, that there was ſomething more behind: that the Queſtion (and the paſſage is made more important by *italics)* was attended by circumſtances which gave it a very different ſhape: that "had a ſimilar difference "of opinion exiſted, with reſpect to any other "queſtion, *attended by the ſame circumſtances*, "the reſult would, in all probability, have been "exactly the ſame." What thoſe circumſtances were we can only conjecture: we are left in that ſtate of uncertainty which, as I ſhall preſently obſerve, it ſeems to have been the object of the "Plain Anſwer" rather to keep up than to remove. What I ſuppoſe the circumſtances to have been, I ſhall ſtate in its proper place: at this moment it may be beſt to return to the Queſtion upon its general grounds.

I have before ſaid that Mr. Pitt had ſufficient reaſon in this caſe to diſtruſt his judgment with reſpect to the Queſtion thus brought forward: and I know not how that will be denied me, when I ground my aſſertion upon the declared ſentiments of Mr. Pitt himſelf, upon his conduct both before this event and ſubſequent to it. Need I add, that I mean the decided oppoſition of Mr. Pitt

Pitt to Mr. Fox's motion for the Repeal of the Teſt Act in 1790, and the force and earneſtneſs with which he argued againſt letting looſe all ſorts of Diſſenters upon the Eſtabliſhment, and, among the reſt, thoſe whom he characterized as the moſt dangerous of all—not only Roman Catholics, but Papiſts?* I appeal further to Mr. Pitt's ſentiments at this moment; to his not having agitated the queſtion in Parliament, and having, therefore, if not given it up, yet acquieſced in the propriety of not bringing it forward. Indeed, I was informed, at the time when the overtures were made for his return into office, that he had made up his mind upon that head, that he had actually relinquiſhed it. As to any abſolute pledge given to the Iriſh Roman Catholics upon the ſubject, as far as I can judge, none ſuch is avowed, nor can even reaſonably be inferred.† The queſtion, therefore, muſt ſtill reſt

* See this point very forcibly ſtated in the Anti-Jacobin Review for November laſt, p. 805.

† There is ſome difficulty in knowing what to ſay upon this ſubject, or in exactly aſcertaining how far the late miniſters, or any individual of them, were pledged. There was a ſtrange paper, or rather two papers (and they were thought not to be very wiſe ones) handed about in Ireland at the time of the change. But even according to the moſt rigid conſtruction which can be put upon them, however they might affect the *return* of miniſtry into office, there is no hint of a *previous* pledge

reſt upon the general grounds upon which I have put it. And if I am correct in the appeal which I have

pledge having exiſted, which could have obliged them *to go out*. It does not appear that Mr. Pitt or any body elſe, previous to the change actually taking place, was abſolutely engaged to force the meaſure upon the king, or upon the nation. One does ſee indeed in that paper an evident deſire to engage the Catholics in the ſupport of thoſe miniſters who had "eſpouſed their intereſts;" who had "ſacrificed their own "ſituations in their cauſe." One even cannot help thinking that thoſe men who were ſo earneſt in courting and ſecuring the good-will of ſo formidable a body, muſt have had an eye to coming in again even at the moment when they went out.

The papers may be ſeen both in Sir Richard Muſgrave's and Mr. Plowden's publications; but they are here ſubjoined, that it may be ſeen whether this be an unfair conſtruction.

"The leading part of his Majeſty's miniſters finding unſur-
"mountable obſtacles to the bringing forward meaſures of
"conceſſion to the Catholic body whilſt in office, have felt it
"impoſſible to continue in adminiſtration under the inability
"to propoſe it with the circumſtances neceſſary to carrying
"the meaſure with all its advantages, and they have retired
"from his Majeſty's ſervice, conſidering this line of conduct
"as moſt likely to contribute to its ultimate ſucceſs. The
"Catholic body will therefore ſee how much their future hopes
"muſt depend upon ſtrengthening their cauſe by good con-
"duct; in the mean time they will *prudently conſider their*
"*proſpects as ariſing from the perſons who now eſpouſe their*
"*intereſts*, and compare them with thoſe, which they could
"look to from any other quarter; they may with confidence
"rely on the ſupport of all thoſe who retire, and of many who
"remain in office, when it can be given with a proſpect of
"ſucceſs.

I have made to Mr. Pitt himſelf, in my reaſoning upon his own meaſures, I need ſay no more

" ſucceſs. They may be aſſured, that *Mr. Pitt will do his* " *utmoſt to eſtabliſh their cauſe in the public favor, and pre-* " *pare the way for their finally attaining their objects:* and " the Catholics will feel, that as Mr. Pitt could not concur in " a hopeleſs attempt to force it now, that he muſt at all times " repreſs with the ſame deciſion as if he held an adverſe " opinion, any unconſtitutional conduct in the Catholic body.

" Under theſe circumſtances it cannot be doubted that the " Catholics will take the moſt loyal, dutiful and patient line " of conduct, that they will not ſuffer themſelves to be led into " meaſures, which can, by any conſtruction, give a handle to " the oppoſers of their wiſhes, either to miſinterpret their " principles, or to raiſe an argument for reſiſting their claims; " but that by their prudent and exemplary demeanour they will " afford additional grounds to the growing number of their " advocates, to enforce their claims on proper occaſions, until " their objects can be finally and advantageouſly attained."

" *The Sentiments of a ſincere Friend (i.e. Marquis Corn-* " *wallis) to the Catholic Claims.*

" If the Catholics ſhould now proceed to violence, or enter- " tain any ideas of obtaining their object by convulſive mea- " ſures, or forming aſſociations with men of Jacobinical " principles, they muſt of courſe loſe the ſupport and aid of " thoſe who have ſacrificed their own ſituations in their " cauſe, but who would at the ſame time feel it to be their " indiſpenſable duty to oppoſe every thing tending to con- " fuſion.

" On the other hand, ſhould the Catholics *be ſenſible of* " *the benefits they poſſeſs by having ſo many characters of* " *eminence*

more upon the ſubject: it is ſufficiently apparent, that it could never be wiſe or juſtifiable in him, (I ſay, juſtifiable as a Stateſman) even if, having changed his opinion, he choſe to agitate a meaſure of ſuch doubtful utility, to maintain it with that pertinacity which ended in his reſignation.

But this will be ſtill more apparent, when we come to the other ground upon which the matter is conſidered, with reſpect to "the time," and the public circumſtances when the event took place; for it is not to be forgotten, as I have above ſtated, that there may be circumſtances which will render it very unwiſe to bring forward even a meaſure that is wiſe in itſelf. If now the ſituation of the country was ſuch as to ſtand moſt particularly in need of Mr. Pitt's abilities, of the abilities of his colleagues; was it wiſe, was it juſtifiable in them to lay ſuch ſtreſs upon a meaſure, which, taking the whole of Mr. Pitt's conduct together, I am warranted in ſaying he muſt have conſidered as a matter, the ex-

"*eminence pledged not to embark in the ſervice of Government,*
"*except on the terms of the Catholic privileges being obtained,*
"it is to be hoped, that on balancing the advantages and diſ-
"advantages of their ſituation they would prefer a quiet
"and peaceable demeanour to any line of conduct of an op-
"poſite deſcription."

Plowden's Hiſtorical Review, vol. iii. p. 944.

 pediency

pediency of which was by no means clear, as a matter even of perilous experiment? Was it wiſe, I ſay, in him or in his aſſociates, ſo to urge ſuch a meaſure, ſo to inſiſt upon it, as to make the continuance of their ſervices to depend upon it; in ſhort, in their opinion, to put the ſafety of the country to the hazard, and in the end to leave it deſtitute of its beſt ſupport? Is there, I ſay, wiſdom, is there true patriotiſm, is there a particle of ſound judgment in this?

Now, as to the real extent of the danger to which the country was expoſed, and the magnitude of the criſis to which it was brought, very different repreſentations have been made of them by the two "Obſervers." Either of them however, let me firſt premiſe, fully warrants the argument which I have above maintained. It is therefore with another view that I am now to conſider the ſubject. Juſtice to Mr. Addington, as well as to Mr. Pitt, requires that, without exaggeration on the one ſide or on the other, we ſhould aſcertain with ſome correctneſs, what was at that time the real ſtate of affairs, what were the difficulties which the new miniſtry may be fairly ſaid to have encountered.

Moſt unqueſtionably the picture which the Near Obſerver has drawn, is moſt grievouſly overcharged; * "the complicated predicament of

* Curſory Remarks, p. 14.

"evil

" evil and deſpondency," " the want of a diſtinct " end," " or remaining object in the war," and the " hopeleſsneſs of our expeditions" are expreſſions which I ſhould have thought none but the members, or the friends, of what is now called the old oppoſition, would have uſed. As little on the other hand can I agree in its full extent to the ſplendid repreſentation given by the other gentleman of * " Jacobiniſm almoſt eradicated ;" " Ireland ready to be tranquillized ;" " our fleets " triumphant ;" " the public credit completely re- " ſtored ;" " the nation reconciled to the exertions " which were called for." It is a miſtaken notion, which was indeed entertained generally enough, that Jacobiniſm was, or is eradicated. I ſhould think that the Middleſex and Nottingham elections had made that point ſufficiently clear. As to the tranquillity of Ireland, it may, I think, be fairly concluded, that in the opinion of Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, it was nothing leſs than ſecure, ſince it could only be eſtabliſhed by a meaſure which many, I believe moſt people, and probably Mr. Addington, conſider as big with the utmoſt ruin. As to the anticipated triumph of our fleet at Copenhagen, I ſhall ſhew that alſo to have been nothing leſs than certain. As to public credit, the funds were not, I believe, at all higher (56 and a fraction) than they are

* Plain Anſwer, p. 9.

at this moment, when we have to experience not only the ſame or as great difficulties in our commerce with the North, but are expoſed to, what moſt people think, very ſerious danger from the projected invaſion of our enemy. And as to the acquieſcence of the nation, it muſt not be denied that there was an expectation and deſire (much too general I will ſay) of peace.

I was not one of thoſe who entertained gloomy apprehenſions; I combated, within my narrow circle, and as ſtrongly as I could, every cry for peace; and would have had every one prepared for a longer conteſt. I did not deſpair—I never deſpaired of the "*res publica*;" but it were folly, or ſomething worſe, to ſay that it was not a moment of great anxiety, of fearful and perplexing doubt; that any man, who had not ſome firmneſs of mind, nay, a very conſiderable portion of it, would at ſuch a moment have undertaken the management of public affairs.

There is a miſtake very commonly made, when men ſpeak of times paſt, that they take into their conſideration events which have ſubſequently happened; they do this, even when they are reaſoning upon people's feelings at the moment. Thus, becauſe our armies conquered in Egypt, becauſe Lord Nelſon was victorious at Copenhagen, men argue as if their ſucceſs had been certain from the very outſet; as if even the paſſage

paſſage of the Sound had not been conſidered as an object of great danger. It is moſt certain, and it were baſe injuſtice to our gallant ſeamen and ſoldiers not to acknowledge, that in both inſtances they had unuſual difficulties to encounter, moſt extraordinary exertions to make. It muſt be ſaid, with reſpect to Egypt in particular, that, without making very large allowances indeed, for Britiſh valour and Britiſh ſkill, we cannot ſtate the forces ſent upon that expedition as fully adequate to their object. It does appear as if the late miniſters had not had correct information reſpecting the numbers of the French troops in that quarter. Our gallant battalions had therefore to effect a landing, and to fight their way under many diſadvantages, in the face of an enemy ſuperior in numbers, as well as in the knowledge of the country. Was there then, as to them, I will aſk, no room for anxiety? And as to Copenhagen, ſetting aſide the other circumſtances of that very hard-fought engagement, and particularly the advantage derived from the wonderful preſence of mind of Lord Nelſon, what, if a certain ſignal, of which ſo much has been ſaid, and about the exiſtence of which there ſeems to be no doubt, what, if that only had been obeyed; as, in the regular courſe of things, it ſhould have been? And now, let me add, what, if only one of theſe expeditions had

had failed (and Mr. Addington had to contemplate ſuch an event as poſſible at leaſt; the recent failure at Ferrol even ſtared him in the face), what might the conſequences have been to the country? what would have been the ſituation of miniſters?

Thoſe who really wiſh to form a fair judgment upon the ſubject, ſhould turn back to the newſpapers of the day: they will there read, as part of the ſpeeches in parliament, or as the ſentiments of men out of doors, aſſertions much ſtronger than any which I have made: ſuch indeed as ſufficiently warrant the "Near Obſerver" in the uſe of the word "conſternation," and the "Accurate Obſerver" in his adoption of it.—They will there find the times repreſented as "full of terror and diſmay," the "criſis as moſt "awful and momentous," as moſt "alarming," as "what in the whole of the Britiſh hiſtory had "not its equal." Among the diſtreſſes of the moment, the ſcarcity, which ſtill continued, is not to be forgotten. But indeed, beſides the general difficulties, there was added one which preſſed in a particular manner upon Mr. Addington himſelf. He could not but be aware that he muſt be known as coming into adminiſtration in direct oppoſition to the meaſure of "Catholic emancipation," as it was called. What might be the immediate conſequences of withholding

holding this boon, could not be aſcertained: he muſt have prepared himſelf to meet the reſentment of all thoſe who expected to ſhare in it; not the Roman Catholics only, but every ſpecies of Diſſenters.

Of what importance this was conceived to be, may be collected from the words of Lord Carliſle, as I find them reported in a Paper of that time.* In a debate of the Houſe of Lords on the 9th of February (the day on which the change of Miniſtry was announced), he is ſtated to have characteriſed the new Adminiſtration, as an Adminiſtration "weak, inefficient, and defective in every point of view, intended to replace "one of ſtrength, vigour and abilities." "This "wretched Adminiſtration," he added, "was "alſo to undertake the dangerous taſk of refuſing a boon which a ſtrong and powerful Ad-"miniſtration had ſhrunk from with appre-"henſion."

I the more readily quote theſe words, not only as they furniſh a ſtrong confirmation of what I have above ſaid, reſpecting the ſuppoſed tranquillization of Ireland, as well as this particular difficulty which Mr. Addington had to contemplate; but as they alſo give the firſt example of that torrent of abuſe, that ſtrain of unqualified

* Porcupine, February 10th.

repro-

reprobation, which he was ſo early called upon to encounter.

From all this, and more might be added, ſome judgment may be formed, whether it is likely that a want of firmneſs ſhould be a prominent feature in the character of a man who conſented to take ſo reſponſible an office under ſuch complicated difficulties. As to any undue motive, as none ſuch has ever been imputed to Mr. Addington, as none can with the leaſt ſhadow of propriety be imputed to him, he needs no defence upon that head. The truth is, and every body muſt acknowledge it, that it was by a concurrence of extraordinary circumſtances that he was, in a manner, compelled to become Miniſter; it was (let us ſpeak plainly) by the diſtreſsful ſituation to which Mr. Pitt and his Colleagues had reduced their Sovereign. They had propoſed to him a meaſure, which not only appeared to him unwiſe and impolitic, but to which he felt that he could not give his aſſent without a breach of his Coronation Oath: yet they ceaſed not to urge the point, nay, they made a concurrence in it on his part the expreſs condition of their continuance in office. Profeſſing, as they afterwards did, to have been governed only by conſcientious motives, they allowed not to their Maſter the privilege which they claimed for themſelves: of his conſcience, even when awakened by the

ſanctity

ſanctity of an oath, no account was to be taken. When it is conſidered that in this ſtreight his Majeſty was, in a manner, ſhut out from the common reſource of reſorting to the Oppoſition; that, though Mr. Pitt had changed his opinion ſince 1790, it was plain enough that Mr. Fox had not; when, I ſay, theſe things are conſidered, we muſt not wonder, if there were found individuals who thought, as the "Near Obſerver" does, that "It appeared as if the friends of the "Ex-Miniſtry would have liked better to have "left his Majeſty altogether without a Cabinet;" as if there had been ſome expectation in the then Miniſtry that his Majeſty might be forced into a compliance with their meaſures. Nay, I have heard this diſtinctly avowed by perſons, who ſcrupled not to tax Mr. Addington with a breach of friendſhip in accepting the ſituation which Mr. Pitt reſigned.* This, however, as not directly affecting Mr. Pitt, or only as matter of ſurmiſe, I would not dwell upon. Still the moſt natural, if not the only way which preſented itſelf to his Majeſty of avoiding what he conceived to be a breach of his oath, was to look out for ſome individual who was not fettered by engagements, and who would endeavour to form an

* This conjecture appears to me to receive conſiderable corroboration from the contents of the Papers ſtated in the preceding Note.

Adminiſtration at liberty to concur in the views of their Sovereign. Such a man was found in Mr. Addington; and thoſe who think, as I believe the great body of the Nation now think, that the meaſure in queſtion was both ruinous and unconſtitutional, muſt applaud him for having come forward to the relief of his Sovereign in ſuch a critical moment. He was in fact ſo applauded at the time, by ſome of theſe very writers who are now moſt laviſh of their abuſe againſt him, who ceaſe not to impute to him the moſt diſhoneſt and mercenary views. * The fact is, that his taking office under thoſe circumſtances, with a relinquiſhment of that ſituation which he was then holding with a degree of reputation and eaſe to himſelf which is abſolutely unparalleled, was conſidered by him, and was conſidered by thoſe who propoſed it to him, and muſt be conſidered by every candid man, as an abſolute and real ſacrifice.

It ſhould however be noticed, that the "more "accurate Obſerver," in his commendation of Mr. Pitt, has aſſerted, † "that that Gentleman "made a diſtinct offer to retain his ſituation un- "til the War ſhould be ended, and the Country

* See particularly the *Porcupine* of that time, contraſted with the *Regiſter* of the preſent day, by the ſame Editor.

† Plain Anſwer, p. 17.

"relieved

" relieved from its moſt preſſing difficulties, pro-
" vided that no attempt would be made in the
" mean time to prejudge the important queſ-
" tion, the difference of opinion on which had
" led to his reſignation." I have heard ſomething of this offer, now mentioned to the public for the firſt time; but what after all does it amount to? Will this writer explain to us what was implied in the aſſurance thus required. By not " pre-
" judging the queſtion," was it meant to be implied, that his Majeſty might at ſome future time admit the propoſition which he now rejected? that his conſcience might be ſoothed into compliance? If it meant this, it meant what Mr. Pitt in ſimilar circumſtances would have rejected with diſdain. If it meant not that, it meant nothing. After all, why make terms, or talk of aſſurances? For who brought this queſtion forward? Who preſſed it upon the Sovereign? Who but Mr. Pitt and his Colleagues? Could they not then ſuffer it quietly to drop? Could they not have retained their opinion, and ſuffered the King to do the ſame; and Mr. Pitt, notwithſtanding, have remained in office until the War ſhould be ended, and the Country relieved from its difficulties.*

Thus

* After all it might be of great importance (ſince the fact is brought forward as being important) to know diſtinctly

 through

Thus far I have reaſoned upon the facts as they may be collected from the "Plain Anſwer;" but it is time to remove this veil of myſtery, and to call the attention of the Public to the real circumſtances of the tranſaction. In doing this, let it be obſerved that I ſhall ſtate nothing which is not as generally known as are the cauſes of any former change of Miniſtry. But ſome how or other (whether from accident or deſign) the real truth has been rather kept back. It is now become abſolutely indiſpenſable to bring it forward, on account of the idea which has gone abroad and been encouraged, if not by Mr. Pitt, yet by thoſe who are his avowed friends, that it is entirely to the friendſhip of that Gentleman, that Mr. Addington owes his ſituation. He has been conſidered by ſome as the mere puppet to be moved by his predeceſſor; and

"through whom," and "to whom," the offer was made, and by whom" not accepted. I ſay this, becauſe from the very unequivocal evidence which we have of Mr. Addington's deſire that Mr. Pitt ſhould be in office, whether as continuing in it, or returning to it, it is evident that he muſt have deſired the offer to be accepted. But indeed is it certain—will the "Plain Obſerver" venture to ſay, that he is not miſtaken in ſaying, that "it was not accepted?" I can conceive pretty good reaſons why Mr. Pitt himſelf ſhould rather wiſh to recal his offer, when he conſidered that a Miniſter remaining in office, under ſuch terms, muſt loſe a conſiderable portion of his influence, and the Government be comparatively weak.

many

many perſons have thought, or affected to think, that without the recommendation and ſupport of that Gentleman, he never could have been placed, or continued to be, at the head of Adminiſtration. This idea is the more neceſſary to be reſiſted, becauſe it is connected with that other equally unfounded and miſchievous poſition, that the preſent Adminiſtration are in themſelves weak and inefficient, and have, in fact, no ſtrength but what they borrow from the ſupport of others. Such are the notions which are at leaſt favoured, if not actually propagated by the preſent counſellors of Mr. Pitt, and ſome of them expreſsly avowed in a publication ſent out into the world under his own eye.* Now mark how "a plain tale ſhall put them down."

The facts are theſe: The late cabinet had arranged their meaſures reſpecting the Roman Catholics, and of courſe the abolition of all teſts, without the leaſt communication with their Sovereign. This very extraordinary change in the conſtitution was all concerted and ready to be brought forward without his Majeſty having the leaſt intimation of it; ſomehow or other, however, it did tranſpire, and came to his Majeſty's ears. On the Tueſday (the of February) the Imperial Parliament had met, and the members proceeded to be ſworn in. It was underſtood (the public will

* Plain Anſwer, p. 29, 69, 78, 79.

recollect

recollect all theſe circumſtances) that the King was to come down to the Houſe of Lords on the Thurſday, for the purpoſe of opening the Seſſions. All at once this was altered, and his Majeſty's coming down delayed till the Monday. It was aſſigned as a reaſon, that more time ſhould be given for members to be ſworn in. The reaſon, however, was this: At the levee on the Wedneſday, his Majeſty, having learnt what was going forward, expreſſed himſelf to Mr. Dundas (now Lord Melville) in very ſtrong and pointed terms upon the ſubject. He did this publicly, and in the hearing of the whole circle. This was, I ſuppoſe, one of the *circumſtances*, and a principal one, alluded to by the "Accurate Obſerver," p. 8. It probably gave the firſt impulſe to the change. What, however, is of moſt importance to the preſent queſtion, is this, and let the reader bear it in mind, that Mr. Addington was, and continued to be ignorant of this, as well as of all that had paſſed, till the moment when, moſt unexpectedly, he received his Majeſty's command to attend him at St. James's, for the purpoſe of forming an adminiſtration.* Whoever conſiders the

* This is the real and plain ſtate of the caſe; ſo little pretence is there for ſtating Mr. Pitt to be the promoter, or even the recommender to office, of Mr. Addington. After this, would not one wonder (if from ſuch a man any thing could excite

the circumſtances of Mr. Addington's ſituation at that time, as I have before ſtated them, will not think it ſtrange that he heſitated; that he took every means to prevent the change that was in agitation; that it was not without great reluctance, and after ſome delay, that the matter was ſettled. It was probably during the interval, that the offer was made, which is ſpoken of in "The Plain Anſwer," When, however, the matter was ſettled, not only Mr. Pitt, but every member of the old adminiſtration expreſſed their hearty joy and ſatisfaction at it. They felt (it was impoſſible that they ſhould not feel) how very advantageous it was to them perſonally, that, if they were to go out, they ſhould be ſucceeded by men who were well diſpoſed towards them; who had approved, and would ſupport, the meaſures of their adminiſtration. Let any one conſider what would have been the conſequences, if his Majeſty had been driven, as he might have been, to call for aſſiſtance upon any of the members of what is termed the "Old Oppoſition." What could the late cabinet have expected in that

excite wonder) at the impudence of Cobbett, who, in one of his late Regiſters, actually ſtates as a fact, that Mr. Pitt almoſt hawked about the adminiſtration; that he offered it firſt to Mr. Ryder, (now Lord Harrowby) before he offered it to Mr. Addington!!!

caſe,

caſe, but that they ſhould be harraſſed with repeated motions of cenſure? That every failure, every embarraſſment which was experienced, ſhould be aſcribed to the folly or the wickedneſs of their counſels? That the nation ſhould be told by thoſe, who would then perhaps have carried the popular cry with them, that affairs had been ſo miſconducted, as to render it almoſt impoſſible either to carry on war, or to make peace? Would not every little defect in their adminiſtration have been brought forward; all their merits kept out of ſight? From this, and much more, they were relieved by Mr. Addington's conſenting to become their ſucceſſor. By his engaging to carry on adminiſtration, they became at once ſecure from every unfair attack, they were enabled to retire in peace, and without, as they conceived, any diminution of character or of reputation.

After this, is it not, I will aſk, rather too much for theſe gentlemen to be now haggling and quibbling about the ſort and degree of ſupport which they engaged to give? Will it be believed, that they were *making terms* with the man who was relieving them from very great and very ſerious difficulties? Does not the very nature of the tranſaction carry with it internal and deciſive evidence, that the promiſe of ſupport,

port, by whomſoever and whenſoever it was given, muſt have been both broad, and cordial and unqualified?

Now, however, we are told, that this promiſe of ſupport was not unqualified; that, on the contrary, it was given ſubject to expreſs limitations. And this is become a material point to be aſcertained, becauſe Lord Grenville moſt unqueſtionably has withdrawn his ſupport altogether; and Mr. Pitt's has only been continued, of late moſt particularly, with ſome reſerve and great coldneſs: as to Mr. Windham, he ſeems not to be at all implicated in the queſtion.

As to this indeed we muſt, it ſeems, come at the truth, if poſſible, from ſomething beſides the direct evidence; for here our two witneſſes poſitively and flatly contradict each other; what is expreſsly aſſerted on the one ſide, is as expreſsly denied on the other. If, however, we ſhould be diſpoſed even to admit, in this inſtance, the claim of the "More Accurate Obſerver," to a "nearer obſervation," yet one thing, in addition to what I have already ſtated, muſt be allowed; that a promiſe of "conſtant, active, and zealous ſupport," muſt have meant, if words mean any thing, ſomething that was not abſolutely precarious, ſomething that implied perſonal confidence; ſomething like a promiſe, that, at leaſt, a favourable conſtruction would be put upon the mea-

ſures of the perſon ſo to be ſupported; that the ſupport would be given chearfully, and not withdrawn but for reaſons the moſt weighty; not for ſlight and petty differences of opinion.

Now, I will aſk any man who has examined, or will take the pains to examine, the conduct of Lord Grenville, or even of Mr. Pitt, for more than a year paſt, whether any ſuch cordiality, or confidence, or perfect co-operation, has been diſplayed by them? Whether, on the contrary, as to Lord Grenville almoſt from the beginning, and as to Mr. Pitt for a conſiderable time back, they have not appeared to look upon their ſucceſſors with a certain degree of ſuſpicion and diſtruſt? And whether the aſſiſtance which they have given, has not been beſtowed with a niggard hand; with a countenance that partook of indifference at leaſt, if not of hoſtility? Have not, I will add, theſe promiſers of ſupport been all along the firſt to canvaſs the proceedings of adminiſtration, with the utmoſt jealouſy and particularity? Have they not ſhewn themſelves ſtudious to point out defects; to deviſe objections?

I know that in one very remarkable inſtance, Mr. Pitt has ſupported the miniſtry without reſerve, and with great effect; but I am not ſure that even then his manner, or even language, was ſuch as quite ſuited the long habits of friendſhip

ſhip in which he had lived with Mr. Addington; and he has lately taken care, materially to qualify, I had almoſt ſaid to retract, the ſhare which they have enjoyed of his approbation. But indeed, independently of the obſervations which naturally ariſe out of Mr. Pitt's ſupport of the peace, it is plain that this furniſhes no contradiction to what I have alleged, ſince, compared with his ſubſequent conduct, it is conſidered on all hands, by Lord Grenville as well as by every body elſe, as a proof of great inconſiſtency in that gentleman.

Such is the light in which the ſubject appears to me, when taken under a general view. It does ſeem as if the promiſe of ſupport (whatever it was, provided only we ſuppoſe it given in ſincerity and ſimplicity of heart,) had not been ſubſtantially complied with, not complied with according to the ſpirit of ſuch an engagement.

Some people may think, that Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, perhaps Lord Grenville more particularly, may have ſeen their error; that they have come to regret the ſituation which they ſo wantonly threw away; that, being diſſatisfied with their own conduct, they have, as many people do, thought it better to be angry with any body elſe than with themſelves; that, in this humour, they have begun by dealing captiouſly

with their friends, and at laſt worked themſelves up into a downright quarrel.

I will not affirm that this is the caſe, but I will ſay that their conduct will be eaſier accounted for, upon this ſuppoſition, than upon any other.

But not to rely upon a general view, let us come to ſomewhat a more particular examination. The ſuppoſed limitation upon this promiſe of ſupport, muſt have been either expreſſed or implied. We are told that there was ſomething diſtinctly expreſſed by Mr. Pitt, upon three points,* but as neither of the points are detailed, it is impoſſible for us to ſay, whether the conditions were ſuch as ought to have been impoſed, whether they were or could have been accepted by Mr. Addington, or whether, after acceptance, they were broken. Upon what can be only vague conjecture, it would be idle to waſte our time. If theſe points are thoſe upon which Mr. Pitt has made his ſtand in oppoſition, they will come to be conſidered by and by. My firm opinion, however, is, that no expreſs promiſe of ſupport was given, and if ſo, there is an end alſo to any ſuppoſed reſtriction or qualification of that promiſe. Both reſted merely in implication.

* Plain Anſwer, p. 20.

What

What then could be the limitation which could or ought to be fairly implied? Let us take Lord Grenville's words in the Houſe of Lords, as ſtated by the "Accurate Obſerver;" *according to him*, his lordſhip connected his ſupport with a promiſe of the preſent adminiſtration to "continue to act upon the ſame *general* ſyſ- "tem which had been adopted by their prede- "ceſſors." Let us now admit this as the principle of Lord Grenville's conduct, both in his ſupport and oppoſition; only bearing in mind that what miniſters were to follow was the *general* ſyſtem adopted by their predeceſſors. This indeed, if it had not been ſo declared, muſt have been ſo underſtood; for to promiſe ſupport only upon condition of approving every *particular* and minute act of an adminiſtration, would be perfectly nugatory. Now, this ſyſtem may be (I had almoſt ſaid, muſt be) conſidered under two heads; as it relates, firſt, to our internal government, and ſecondly, to our foreign relations, particularly the war with France.

As to the firſt point, I apprehend that, what that ſyſtem was, may be ſummed up in a few words: that it conſiſted (and ſurely I put it not unfavourably for the late miniſters,) in the maintenance of our conſtitution, and of the monarchy in particular, againſt the attacks of faction, and more eſpecially, what is called Jacobiniſm. Now

as

as in reſpect of this, I have heard no charge againſt Mr. Addington, as having been guilty of any poſitive offence or criminal negligence, I may put that out of the queſtion.

I go indeed upon the preſumption that, the omitting to renew the bill for the ſuſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus act, and other bills of the ſame nature, will not be conſidered as ſuch a departure. It will hardly be imputed as a crime to Mr. Addington, that under his adminiſtration the nation is more generally quiet and apparently contented, while at the ſame time, we have no ſeditious aſſemblies, while the conſtitution is preſerved, and the ſovereign beloved and reſpected.

We come then to the ſecond head; that of tranſactions with foreign powers, and eſpecially with that which ſeems almoſt to have ſwallowed up all the others, the government (for it cannot be called either monarchy, ariſtocracy, or democracy) of France. With reſpect to this, I underſtand the object to be attained by the war with that power, to have been diſtinctly ſtated by Mr. Pitt, as "Indemnity for the paſt and ſecurity for the future." This has been ſo often repeated, that as to this point there can be no miſtake. Now, a peace has been made by Mr. Addington with that government, about which, certainly there have been different opinions, and various: but the only light in which we are

now

now to view it, is, whether that peace was a departure from the general ſyſtem adopted by the laſt adminiſtration. Perhaps other people may claim a right of judging whether it was ſuch a departure, but ſurely when the accuſation is brought by members of the old cabinet, nothing can be more fair and unexceptionable than to refer ourſelves to the declared opinion of the individual members who compoſed that very cabinet.

Now as to this, the firſt of them, the acknowledged prime miniſter, Mr. Pitt, has given his decided approbation to the peace; we muſt conclude that it is ſuch a peace as he would have made. I will aſk them, with ſuch a ſanction as this, with the head of the late adminiſtration giving his full concurrence to the meaſure which is excepted againſt, can miniſters fairly be conſidered as liable to be arraigned "for having de-"parted from the general ſyſtem of their prede-"ceſſors."? From whom are we to take the general ſentiments of a cabinet, but from him who is allowed to take the lead in it? who ſhall ſay whether a rule or principle has been adhered to, if not the perſon who himſelf laid it down?

But indeed, I need not reſt upon Mr. Pitt's deciſion only; let the voices of the late cabinet individually be counted, and Lords Grenville and Spencer, and Mr. Windham are ſtill but

but a minority. Lord Melville, I admit, did not approve of the peace, but he has not on that or any other account, gone into oppoſition.

This, however, is not all: take not only the preſent opinions of the late miniſters, but, what is ſtronger, examine their meaſures. Did they not themſelves treat with the French government, under the Directory? Did they not proffer terms, in the firſt inſtance, which, even if they had been adhered to, (and they were profeſſedly not an ultimatum) were not very widely different from thoſe in queſtion? Does the Peace of Amiens, I ſay, if fairly and candidly conſidered, deſerve to be reprobated, as a departure from the general ſyſtem of thoſe who conducted the negociations at Liſle?

If this reaſoning be juſt, and I ſee not how it is defective, if the great and important meaſure upon which mens' minds are divided, affords no juſtification for Lord Grenville's conduct, let him not, let not his advocates, reſort to differences upon petty points, to quarrels for ſtraws, which none but men, previouſly diſſatisfied, will raiſe, and which do no credit to thoſe who enter into them.

I muſt therefore take it, that it does appear, that the conduct of miniſters has not been ſuch, in the opinion of their predeceſſors themſelves, as to ſet Lord Grenville or his colleagues free from

from the promiſe which they had given, even upon the grounds ſtated by himſelf. But I will go farther, and ſay, that, if we take their own judgment, a difference of opinion upon the queſtion of peace, or war with France, is no cauſe of diſunion between people really united, and therefore ought to be no reaſon for the ſame people to withdraw their ſupport, where they really meant to give it.

I need hardly add that, I allude to the difference of opinion which prevailed in the late cabinet upon the "Projet" at Liſle. Mr. Windham, it ſeems, totally diſapproved of it; yet he not only went on with the ſame perſons in adminiſtration, but even, as it is ſtated, ſtood up in defence of the meaſure in Parliament. Let it be recollected, that a member of a cabinet is now underſtood to be reſponſible for every meaſure in which he joins; and yet Mr. Windham, under this reſponſibility, ſupported a meaſure which he condemned; and Lord Grenville and he went on in perfect harmony together. How then ſhould it happen, that in a caſe where no reſponſibility was incurred, and only a ſimple aſſent, or perhaps a forbearance to diſſent was required, nay, even a diſſent ſimply and without violence expreſſed, would have been accepted, ſuch an uncommon delicacy ſhould all at once have prevailed, a ſenſe of duty ſo imperious ſhould all at once have

ſhewn itſelf? How is it, that preciſely the ſame meaſure (for the difference as to this purpoſe, is immaterial) which was before ſo coolly acquieſced in, ſhould now provoke ſuch a torrent of indignation?

But this, too, is not all: How is it that this ſame Peace of Amiens, which has all of a ſudden made ſuch a monſter of Mr. Addington, has in no way derogated from the luſtre of Mr. Pitt's character? How is it that, while it has ſet Lord Grenville at ſuch a fearful diſtance from the former gentleman, it has only connected his Lordſhip more cloſely with the latter? It will not be ſaid, that there is this difference between them, that Mr. Addington made the peace, while Mr. Pitt only would have made it if he could. As ſtateſmen, I preſume, they are both equally committed, guilty or innocent in an equal degree. How then, I repeat it, can Lord Grenville aſſign that meaſure as a juſt cauſe of violent oppoſition to Mr. Addington, which he conſiders as no bar to an union with Mr. Pitt?

Is it then too much to ſay, are there not grounds to conclude, that either Lord Grenville was not, from the very beginning, hearty in the promiſe of ſupport which he gave, or that he very ſoon repented, and determined to get rid of it.

I will admit that this cannot, upon equally ſtrong

ſtrong grounds, be inferred, of Mr. Pitt. I am willing to believe, that having once entered into engagements, he was diſpoſed, under any ſuppoſed diſadvantage, to adhere to them. I will believe, that he was not ſo inſenſible to the force of private friendſhip, as to reſolve all at once to ſeparate himſelf from the companion of his youth, and the friend of his riper years; from the man with whom he had lived ſo long upon terms of the utmoſt familiarity; with whom, down to the laſt moment, he had been in the habit of communicating in the moſt unreſerved manner, upon every public and every private ſubject. I believe that he felt, as every man muſt feel, that, laying aſide all quibbling upon terms, Mr. Addington, by taking office with his approbation, and under ſuch circumſtances, had acquired a claim to his ſupport; to real, honeſt, and ſubſtantial ſupport. I believe, as I ſaid before, that he was diſpoſed to give it, and will further acknowledge, that he ſet out with giving it moſt fairly and honourably. But Mr. Pitt, though a great man, is but a man; and all men, even great men, and great men perhaps moſt of all, have perſons about them by whoſe advice or converſation they are liable to be influenced; and by whoſe partial or intereſted views, they not unfrequently ſuffer their private judgment to be warped. Some of theſe minor

friends, (or " pretended friends," I might ſay with the " More Accurate Obſerver,") of Mr. Pitt had gone out with him, and probably (according to the expreſſion reported of a late noble lord, when the coalition miniſtry was routed) becauſe they " thought it the beſt lay." They imagined that they had only walked out in order to come in again in higher ſituations. When they found this event delayed, nay, that from the turn which things were taking, it became a little problematical whether it would ever take place, they naturally became uneaſy; that uneaſineſs was vented by ſome of them in Parliament, and in terms which were generally thought rather extraordinary. But in order to accompliſh their ends, it was further neceſſary, not only that the miniſtry ſhould go out, but that Mr. Pitt ſhould be active in turning them out. To perſuade him, therefore, to declare himſelf in oppoſition, became to them an object of the firſt conſequence; and it is eaſy to conceive, that means of effecting this would not in their opinion be wanting. In particular, the idea which was ſo ſtudiouſly propagated of the weakneſs and inability of miniſters might be brought forward, the dangers of the country might be exagerated, and much regret be expreſſed that it ſhould be left deſtitute of his ſupport; and then, as of courſe, the perſuaſion that he

he was the only man who could ſave the ſtate, would ſoon be converted into a duty incumbent upon him to wreſt the adminiſtration from the feeble hands in which it was placed.

It was owing probably to ſuggeſtions like theſe, or cauſes of this nature, that towards the end of the year before laſt, a gradual decreaſe began to be obſerved in the cordiality of Mr. Pitt's proceedings towards Mr. Addington; and there appeared ſufficient reaſon to apprehend, that unleſs ſome alteration took place, the miniſter would ſoon ſee his former friend ranging himſelf in decided oppoſition, or maintaining ſuch a ſuſpicious and uncertain neutrality, as would be not leſs, and perhaps more detrimental than the moſt declared hoſtility.

It was, no doubt, in order to avert a ſtate of things ſo diſtreſſing to his private as well as to his public feelings, to procure a return of that friendſhip which he continued affectionately to cheriſh, as well as to ſecure to the country the more immediate aſſiſtance of abilities which were valued as highly by him as by any man alive, that Mr. Addington, early in the laſt year, readily liſtened to ſuggeſtions thrown out (no matter by whom) of Mr. Pitt's being diſpoſed to enter again into adminiſtration. This brings us to the conſideration of our third point, viz. "The circumſtances of the negotiation for the

"return

" return of Mr. Pitt into office :" and here again, I ſhall have to ſhew that the " More Accurate " Obſerver" is wrong, not only in his reaſoning, but in a point of fact; in the very contradiction which he gives to the " Near Obſerver" as to that fact.

Now I would firſt obſerve, that it ſeems to me of no great conſequence by whom the firſt *formal* intimation was given; and I am not therefore inclined to diſpute the aſſertion of the " More " Accurate Obſerver," " that the negotiation " originated with Mr. Addington." I of courſe acquit Mr. Pitt of any imputation which could ariſe from the contrary ſuppoſition. I cannot, however, ſubſcribe to the aſſertions of that gentleman, that Mr. Addington was led to do it by a ſenſe of his weakneſs, which made " his wiſh " for Mr. Pitt increaſe with the difficulty of " his ſituation." This is a paltry device to make people ſuppoſe that Mr. Addington was apprehenſive he could not ſtand without the aid of Mr. Pitt.* He had no ſuch apprehenſions, and the

* This is clear, from the æra of the commencement of theſe negotiations being kept out of ſight. The whole is thrown forward to the end of March, when the renewal of the war began to be looked for; and not a word is ſaid of what paſſed in January, when Sebaſtiani's Report had not been publiſhed, and when therefore the preſervation of peace was ſtill in contemplation.

the event has proved that he had no reaſon to entertain any ſuch apprehenſions. His motives I have

templation. But, perhaps, this was only that overture, on the part of Mr. Addington, which is characteriſed by the "More Accurate Obſerver," as being "too fooliſh, I had al- "moſt ſaid too inſulting, to be mentioned." If the date of this be as I have ſuppoſed it, it is ſufficiently apparent why it is not mentioned. But further, what is all this delicacy upon the ſubject? Why will not the gentlemen ſpeak out? is it indeed in mere mercy to Mr. Addington? Why theſe hints, and inuendos, and half ſentences? What was this ſame overture? how made, and through whom? What friend of Mr. Pitt's or of Mr. Addington's was it, that had the front to take upon himſelf the making of an overture to Mr. Pitt, which was not only fooliſh, but almoſt inſulting? I have heard only of Lord Melville and Mr. Long as having been at all engaged in any negotiation. Did either of thoſe gentlemen venture to be the bearer of ſuch a propoſal to Mr. Pitt? Would either of them open their lips to him upon any offer that they did not conceive to be perfectly honourable and liberal?—Really, this kind of management brings back to one's mind what we read reſpecting the conduct of the "Little Senate" of another great man. We ſee this new band of Theban brothers, after the model of their predeceſſors,

> Willing to wound, and yet afraid to ſtrike;
> Juſt hint a fault, and heſitate diſlike.

But now, ſuppoſe an overture was made, ſhort of Mr. Pitt's returning to the very ſituation which he formerly occupied; might there not be ſome reaſon for this? Let any man conſider the pledge given by Mr. Pitt to the Roman Catholics of Ireland in the papers above referred to, and ſay, if there was not

I have already ſtated, and will ſtate again, as what, in the eyes of every unprejudiced perſon, muſt do him the greateſt honour. Independent of his own private feelings, he conceived that he ſhould beſt conſult the advantage of his Sovereign and the country, by procuring for them the aſſiſtance of all the talents and the abilities which could be made uſeful, and by giving all poſſible effort to thoſe talents. Therefore it was that Mr. Addington's propoſal ultimately extended even to placing Mr. Pitt at the head of Adminiſtration, to making him as much prime miniſter as he was before, and indeed, I believe, more ſo; for I believe that he would have found Mr. Addington a much more tractable colleague than Lord Grenville. This the "Accurate Obſerver" well knows, and yet in ſeveral paſſages he intimates the direct contrary. In one page he ſtates, that the profeſſed object of the negotiation was "to place Mr. Pitt at the head "of the government of the country;"* yet, in the page immediately oppoſite, we are told, forſooth, that Mr. Pitt "had no inclination

not ſtrong ground for doubting whether he would, or indeed could, with any degree of conſiſtency, again take the firſt ſeat in adminiſtration, while the demands of that body of people remained unſatisfied?

* Plain Anſwer, p. 28.

"to

" to take office merely *as an acceſſion* to the " preſent adminiſtration."

Nothing can more decidedly prove Mr. Pitt to have been wrong in his refuſal, than the pains which are taken to diſguiſe the true ſtate of the caſe, and to put it upon any ground but the true one. Why talk of " terms dictated by " the preſent miniſters?" As if any thing hard or unfair was meant to Mr. Pitt; as if it was not profeſſed and intended to put Mr. Pitt on a footing not only of equality with Mr. Addington, but, as the " Near Obſerver" truly ſtates, " beyond it:"

Let us take the fact as ſtated:—" The propoſal " was made through a friend (Lord Melville is " mentioned) for Mr. Pitt to reſume his former " ſituation in the Cabinet, and that vacancies " would be made for the purpoſe of admitting " Lord Melville into the Cabinet, and others of " Mr. Pitt's friends into different official ſitua- " tions."—Now let it be conſidered, who, beſides Mr. Addington, are the members of the Cabinet? Be it remembered that they were originally Mr. Pitt's friends, and not Mr. Addington's; that they even came into the Cabinet, not only invited, but named by Mr. Pitt; and what could be apprehended by Mr. Pitt from an adminiſtration compoſed of ſuch perſons? What doubt could be entertained of his maintaining all the

influence and all the preponderance which belong to a Prime Minister? Can any man seriously believe that he could object upon any such grounds? For we are not told what situation Mr. Addington could be placed in upon any such supposition, or how it was to be contrived that he should take the lead of his leader. The fact is, that in this respect, as in all others, Mr. Addington acted towards Mr. Pitt with that full confidence which became an honourable man towards one whom he considered to be equally honourable, and, as yet, his friend. He offered either to go out entirely, or to take the situation, whatever it was, which Mr. Pitt should assign him; such a situation as would put it out of his power, if he were so inclined, to be again Mr. Pitt's successor. Could now, I ask, Mr. Addington give stronger or more unequivocal proofs of his sincerity, of his attachment, to Mr. Pitt, nay, implicit reliance upon him? If any thing was wanting, I might add Lord Melville's judgment upon the point; his mind was so completely satisfied, that he lamented and condemned Mr. Pitt's obstinacy. Will it be supposed that such an old statesman as he, with all his experience, could be mistaken, or that he joined in deceiving Mr. Pitt?

To a proposal so liberal, so friendly, hear what, according to the "Accurate Observer,"

was

was Mr. Pitt's anſwer: " He would not at all " enter into the queſtion of arrangements with- " out a meſſage from His Majeſty."—Well now, ſuppoſe that meſſage received, would he then liſten only for a moment to Mr. Addington? No; " *he* would then ſubmit" (not a word all this time of Mr. Addington more than if he were dead) " to His Majeſty's conſideration an ad- " miniſtration compoſed of members of the laſt " and preſent miniſtry," of whom thoſe only were ſpecifically named who were known to be decidedly hoſtile to Mr. Addington, and to have treated him with the utmoſt contempt and obloquy.

I know not how this view of the caſe ſtrikes the " Accurate Obſerver," or will ſtrike any indifferent perſon; but, if I could believe this anſwer to have been really given, I ſhould ſay it almoſt juſtified all that has been ſaid by Mr. Pitt's bittereſt enemies, of his intolerable arrogance and diſregard for the feelings of others. What! to a propoſal, and ſuch a propoſal, made by a miniſter in place, an anſwer is given which conſiders him as a perſon not at all to be treated with; as a mere meſſenger to make known to His Majeſty the conditions upon which this lofty individual would vouchſafe his ſervices. Such is the ſtatement which this judicious advocate puts forth, as coming from the firſt authority.

His whole efforts are directed to make the public believe, that Mr. Pitt did not make Lord Grenville's admiſſion into the Cabinet a "fine quâ "non," of his returning into office. Now, I apprehend, that it may be ſhewn from the very words of the "Accurate Obſerver" himſelf, that the fact was ſo.

One would think, indeed, that there was an odium neceſſarily attached to this ſame "fine quâ non;" for the "Obſerver," in the very next page, endeavours to fix ſomething like it on Mr. Addington: he ſays, the negociation terminated becauſe Mr. Addington "*ultimately* de- "clared, that nothing could induce him to "afford even the chance of admitting Lord "Grenville into the Cabinet." This, indeed, ſeems dextrouſly enough, but clearly enough, thrown out for the purpoſe of fixing the blame of the failure in this negotiation on Mr. Addington. But, I will aſk, of what conſequence was it to the negotiation that Mr. Addington, firſt or laſt, had determined not to admit Lord Grenville into the Cabinet, if Mr. Pitt had not made that admiſſion a "fine quâ non."*

There is yet indeed ſome obſcurity hanging over this. I have heard of letters circulated in explanation of this tranſaction as coming from Mr. Pitt, but of theſe I can ſay nothing. One

* Plain Anſwer, p. 27.

fact

fact however I know, and it is ſuch a one as cannot be immaterial. Towards the end of the negotiation, Mr. Pitt being then at Walmer, Lord Grenville went down and ſpent five or ſix days with him; and it was only when Mr. Pitt returned to town after this viſit, that the admiſſion of the Grenville's into office was inſiſted upon as the condition of his reſuming the adminiſtration.*

There next follows a laboured and a long argument intended to ſhew, that for any thing that Lord Grenville had done, Mr. Addington ought not to have objected to his being taken in the Adminiſtration. This, I apprehend, may be diſpatched in a few words.

* There are many more points in the Plain Anſwer, as to which we are left in a ſtate of uncertainty. It ſhould ſeem as if the gentlemen who wrote it were too witty for plain matter of fact. To follow them, is like running after a "Will of "the Wiſp." The moment we think that we are arriving at the truth, the light ſuddenly vaniſhes, and we are left to grope our way in the dark. One cannot help wiſhing that Jupiter himſelf would emerge from behind his ſatellites and diſpel the cloud. One feels inclined to ſay,

Δος οφθαλμοισιν ιδεσθαι,
Ευ δε φαει και ολεσσον, επει νυ τοι ευαδεν ουτως.

The Reader here will bear in mind that other ingenious Pamphlet, which is regularly announced in the Papers, as "being the ſubject of converſation," and "written by Mr. "Robert Ward, Member for Cockermouth."—(See Morning Poſt of Feb. 2.)

Firſt,

Firſt, I apprehend, it muſt be allowed, that ſome important and ſerious differences exiſted between Lord Grenville and Mr. Addington upon great political queſtions: for, unleſs ſuch a difference exiſted, how was Lord Grenville juſtified in withdrawing his ſupport from Miniſtry; and if they did exiſt, can there be a more ſufficient reaſon why they ſhould not act together?

But, it is argued, "as the war now appeared "inevitable, it could no longer be an objection "that Lord Grenville's diſpoſition was too war-"like:"—this too admits of an anſwer. It might not, upon a ſuppoſition that the war was to laſt for ever; but I ſuppoſe that every Miniſtry looks to a peace at ſome time or other. When a peace was again to be negotiated, pray whoſe ideas were to be followed? For, upon this ſubject, the gentlemen might be "far as "the poles aſunder;" or muſt Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt again go out, in order that Mr. Addington may negotiate: or will they borrow a hint from Mr. Windham, to teach them how to be accommodating upon ſuch occaſions?

We now come to a part of Lord Grenville's defence, which I was glad to ſee. I congratulate very much Mr. Canning (or whoever is the "More "Accurate Obſerver,") upon the diſcovery which has been made, ſomewhat late indeed, that "the

"uſe

" uſe of expreſſions, more harſh and ſevere than " the occaſion juſtifies on which they are ap- " plied, is always objectionable :" that " it often " manifeſts ill humour, and always bad taſte." If Mr. Canning himſelf be not the writer of this, I recommend it ſeriouſly to his conſideration, as well as to that of his late friend Mr. William Cobbett, who every week treats us with ſuch a plentiful combination of this ſame " ill " humour" and " bad taſte."

It is indeed at preſent underſtood, that Mr. Canning no longer lends his aſſiſtance to the Political Regiſter, ſince that publication ventured to allot to Mr. Pitt a ſhare of that cenſure which Mr. Canning would have reſerved excluſively for Mr. Addington. Still, however, the effects of his labours continue to be felt. The Editor, who is no man of wit himſelf, in default of a more regular ſupply from Mr. Windham, ſupports himſelf with the ſcraps which he picked up from his former aſſociate. " The Doctor" and " the ſtrait waiſtcoat," his " pills" and " boluſſes," are pretty regularly brought forward every week, to remind us of the time when Mr. Canning ſhone forth, as what the " Near Obſerver" calls him " a hero " of ſquibs and epigrams, a leader of doggrel " and lampoon, a power in the war of invective

" and

" and abuſe, an inſtrument of Mr. Windham,
" an auxiliary of Cobbett."

Perhaps ſome charitable friend may have reminded Mr. Canning, that Mr. Pitt, when he firſt took the lead in Adminiſtration, was treated with the ſame variety of abuſe, with that mixture of wit and dulneſs, low ſcurrility, and pointed raillery, which ſome people think themſelves juſtified in venting, without any diſcrimination, upon all who are their opponents in politics. He may have been put in mind too, that nothing which he has written, in point of wit and humour, equals the Rolliad and Probationary Odes: and he cannot but know, that, notwithſtanding all that could be done by the greateſt maſters of ridicule, Mr. Pitt continued in office ſeventeen years, every year more fixed; and was at laſt turned out only by himſelf.

If theſe and ſuch conſiderations ſhall have made their due impreſſion upon Mr. Canning, and given him to underſtand that where the characters or the meaſures of men are concerned, a page of ſound ſenſe is often worth, in point of effect as well as of morality, whole volumes of abuſe and raillery, I ſhall think it a fortunate circumſtance. I cannot, however, by this new light which has broken in upon him, or the " more accurate Obſerver," diſcern that " the

" harſh

"harſh and uncivil" * (we may ſay, virulent) language of Lord Grenville is not to be taken into the account, when the propriety of his being aſſociated in the Adminiſtration with Mr. Addington, is conſidered.

It is not that "harſh expreſſions in debate "are quite unpardonable:"—Not that, or much more, is quite, or in any degree "unpardonable." I have however always underſtood, that, according to the perfect law of ethics, repentance is to precede any claim to forgiveneſs: and I do not find that Lord Grenville has repented, or is not diſpoſed to repeat the ſame harſh language. But indeed this need not be inſiſted upon: for, particularly upon the ſubject of politics, nay all other, it muſt be ſaid that obduracy is not the vice of the Nation. We are a very forgiving people: and when I ſee Mr. Fox, after all that he has ſaid, after all that he has done, in the cauſe of our enemies, and the enemies of ſocial order; even now that he continues to be the advocate of Bonaparte; not only endured, but complimented and heard with favour in the Houſe of Commons, nay pointed out, by thoſe from whom we ſhould leaſt have expected it, as a fit perſon to be one of the ſaviours of the Nation at this criſis, I am loſt in admiration of that

* Plain Anſwer, p. 29, 30.

good-nature or cullibility, for which my poor Country, in her character of John Bull, has at all times been diſtinguiſhed. *

I cannot indeed admit that the inſtances which the "accurate Obſerver" has alleged of Mr. Tierney and Mr. Sheridan, in any degree apply to the caſe of Lord Grenville: for, in the firſt place, Mr. Sheridan is not in office, and the ſituation in which Mr. Tierney is placed, is far inferior to that which was aſked for Lord Grenville. He indeed properly comes in as an "acceſſion" to the Adminiſtration, not as an original or leading member of it. But there remains yet another ſtriking difference. Theſe Gentlemen were in long habits of oppoſition to Mr. Pitt as well as Mr. Addington, there was therefore nothing in their language but what might be looked

* Even while I am writing this, out comes that other Pamphlet, which I have before noticed, a "*Verboſa et Grandis Epiſtola,*" from another friend of Mr. Pitt, ſtiling himſelf, a "Member of Parliament." To the very extraordinary and queſtionable aſſertions made in that publication I have not time to pay particular attention: I hope moſt of them are already anticipated and anſwered. But I mention it here on account of the direct reference which is made in the concluſion of it to Mr. Fox, as to one of the ſaviours of the Country:—"Mr. "Fox's mind is of the very firſt claſs! it is *dreadful*" (obſerve *dreadful*; all the machinations of Bonaparte are nothing to it, *dreadful!*) "to think that the whole of this ability (that of "the Oppoſition benches) is excluded from the Cabinet."

for:

for; nothing in fact excluſively directed to Mr. Addington: on the contrary, they had both of them much ſoftened, I may ſay, even dropped their oppoſition in favour of him. As to the pleaſantry alluded to, Mr. Sheridan was in that inſtance particularly "labouring in his vocation," there was real wit in it; the very *ſcurrility* of it made it harmleſs;* it ſet all ſides of the Houſe in a roar, and gave nobody any pain. But is not this ſomething materially different from the caſe of a perſon who takes a ſudden and direct turn; who from being a friend and aſſociate becomes all at once, and from what are conceived to be very inadequate cauſes, a violent enemy and opponent. Has Mr. Canning, or the "accurate Obſerver," to learn, that to be deſerted by thoſe who have promiſed ſupport, in even common caſes, ranks as among the marked calamities of life: ſtill more, when we are treated with contempt and inſult by thoſe from whom we looked to receive only good offices.

But, in truth, it was not a few or many "harſh expreſſions" only of Lord Grenville, which rendered him, in the opinion of Mr. Addington, a

* Obſerve now the laboured Comments of the "Member "of Parliament" upon this ridiculous jeſt; with his laudable anxiety in favour of a certain part which he conſiders as unfairly dealt with.—*View of the Relative Situations*, &c. p. 10.

very unfit perſon to be aſſociated with him in the Adminiſtration. It was the whole tenour of his conduct, it was his declared diſpoſition, which nobody has ever yet alleged was, or is in any degree, altered: it was the effect which it was feared the aſſociation of Lord Grenville might have had upon the minds of the People. It might have rendered the ſincerity of Miniſters ſuſpected in every act of their Adminiſtration. After all, what need is there of ſo many words? Has not the "more accurate Obſerver" himſelf ſtated, that Lord Grenville had entered into a *ſyſtematic* oppoſition? We have heard of ſyſtems which may be accommodated to any particular purpoſe, but we are not told that Lord Grenville's was of that nature; and who ever thought a man blameable, becauſe he declined to undertake, without abſolute neceſſity, the reconciling of oppoſite ſyſtems?

Surely, under all theſe circumſtances, the wonder is not that Mr. Addington ſhould have declined to act with Lord Grenville, but that Lord Grenville or any one elſe ſhould have entertained the idea of propoſing ſuch a junction. It is to me a great wonder that Mr. Pitt could have brought himſelf to mention it, at a time when he was receiving ſuch a proof of Mr. Addington's entire friendſhip and confidence: it does ſeem to me that Mr. Pitt had not for an inſtant

taken

taken into his conſideration what Mr. Addington's feelings upon the ſubject muſt be: it does ſeem to me that he never looked into his own boſom, or aſked himſelf how he would have felt if ſuch a propoſal had been made to him under the ſame circumſtances. For, I will ask, what would have been the caſe, if Mr. Addington had agreed to Lord Grenville and Lord Spencer's returning into office? Would it not have had the appearance of moſt decidedly pronouncing judgment againſt himſelf, as to all the great points upon which there had been a difference? Would not that reſpectable bell-wether, Mr. Cobbett, and all the reſt of the party, have echoed without ceaſing, that now it was plain that all that they had advanced was but too true: that Mr. Addington, after making a diſhonourable and precarious Peace, and provoking (as they now moſt conſiſtently ſay) a return of War, was fain to acknowledge his folly, and fly for aſſiſtance to thoſe Gentlemen whoſe advice he had ſo obſtinately rejected.

This was the enviable ſituation into which Mr. Pitt was ſo reſolutely bent upon forcing his old and tried friend: obſerve too, that no ſuch concluſions could be drawn againſt Lord Grenville. By continuing out of place his Lordſhip incurred no diſgrace: he might ſtay where he was, and neither he nor any body elſe be the worſe for it.

For

For however ſome people, and Lord Grenville among the reſt, may inſiſt that the Country cannot be ſaved without the aſſiſtance of Mr. Pitt, I never heard any ſuch aſſertion made with reſpect to Lord Grenville.

There only remains to be noticed one other propoſition of the "accurate Obſerver," upon which if Mr. Pitt reſts his caſe, all that has been ſaid or written becomes quite ſuperfluous.— "Surely," ſays he, "it was for Mr. Pitt to ap- "preciate the talents and qualifications of thoſe "with whom he was to riſk his character, and "to conſider upon what terms he would return "into office conſiſtently with his own credit, and "the public intereſt. None can queſtion his right "to determine that point for himſelf." To this I anſwer, Certainly: but then allow to Mr. Addington the ſame liberty of judgment as to the terms upon which he would reſign: but then, as I ſaid before, what becomes of this Appeal to the Public? For what purpoſe is all this waſte of words? What has made this diſcuſſion neceſſary, but that Mr. Pitt's friends aſſerted that he had reaſon on his ſide, and undertook to prove it?

We come now to what is ſtated as the laſt head, viz. "The conduct of theſe perſons in Par- "liament," that is, of Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham. I have before ſaid that the queſtion with reſpect to each of them ſtands upon diffe-

different and diſtinct grounds: and, indeed, in conſidering the three firſt points, Mr. Windham's name hardly came to be mentioned. His ſituation in the Cabinet was ſubordinate; his going out of office was at the time hardly thought worthy of particular notice; nor has it ever been enquired whether he gave any promiſe of ſupport to the preſent Miniſters: and as to the Negociation with Mr. Pitt, he ſeems not to have been in the contemplation of either party. He is not, I believe, ſuppoſed (except by one perſon with whom he has almoſt identified himſelf) to be one of thoſe characters, without whoſe aid the Country cannot be ſaved. Yet certainly the very particular and pointed manner in which he has ſet himſelf in oppoſition, not merely to Miniſters, but to the ſentiments of the Nation at large, will hardly permit any perſon who writes upon public ſubjects at this moment, to paſs him by in ſilence. Of the nature and grounds of his oppoſition, as well as Lord Grenville's, I ſhall therefore have ſomething to ſay when I come to the charges which are ſo loudly made by a few perſons againſt the preſent Miniſters, as if they were void of all talent, and totally incapable of directing the affairs of this kingdom. I ſhall, however, firſt diſpatch what I have to ſay of Mr. Pitt.

What my objection is, what I believe Mr. Addington's

dington's objection to be to this Gentleman's conduct in Parliament, may, I think, very clearly be collected from what I have already laid down. It is not, I ſhould ſay perhaps (for as to his preſent conduct there is hardly a queſtion) *it has not been* friendly; it has not been cordial, not ſuch as ſhewed a continuance of that friendſhip and good-will which Mr. Addington had a right to expect. His ſupport has not been even that which an indifferent perſon coming into office under ſuch circumſtances, and purſuing the ſame line of conduct, would have been entitled to claim: ſtill leſs was it that which was due to a man who had been his intimate friend and companion for ſo many years, who had gone along with him in every public meaſure, and in the very act of taking office, was plainly doing an act of friendſhip.

When I ſay too that it was not friendly, not what it ought to have been, I ſhould add, that perhaps this conſiſted more in the manner than in the matter, in the countenance than in the words. I muſt however except from this, the line which was taken upon Mr. Patten's motion for cenſure, and which certainly approached as near to direct hoſtility, as it was poſſible, without a total diſregard of conſiſtency. I ſhould alſo except that, which indeed was conſidered by every one who heard it, as an unequivocal avowal

of

of a change in his ſentiments towards Mr. Addington, the ungracious ſubſtitution of the words, "Right Hon. Gentleman," for thoſe of "Right Hon. Friend;" and which, if I am not miſtaken, firſt took place in the debate on the Addreſs. This might indeed have been put to the ſcore of manner only, if theſe expreſſions were not commonly received in Parliament as denoting the Party of the individual rather than perſonal attachment. But, excluſive of theſe two particulars, I know not that Mr. Pitt, if he had been ſo minded, might not have done all that he has done in the Houſe of Commons without any material injury to the connection ſubſiſting between him and Mr. Addington. The points upon which he differed were not of ſuch magnitude, but that the difference might have been ſuffered to exiſt, and been in ſuch a manner declared, as to cauſe no ſeparation or even coolneſs between them. But this was evidently what Mr. Pitt, for ſome reaſon or other, was not at all ſtudious of avoiding, and the natural conſequence could be no other than what has happened, that the breach ſhould become wider every day, till they ſhould come at laſt to be as far aſunder as Mr. Pitt's new friends could wiſh.

But now, as to this motion of Mr. Patten's, let us examine a little what it was, and what neceſſity could exiſt for Mr. Pitt to act as he did.

Here was a motion very much at length, containing a heavy cenſure upon Miniſters for almoſt every thing they had done, or indeed had not done, ſince the Definitive Treaty. To this Mr. Pitt declared that he could not give his aſſent, becauſe, though he did not approve the whole of the conduct of Miniſters, yet he was not prepared to go the full length of that cenſure; becauſe alſo he thought the motion improper, at a juncture when the defence of the Country required the whole time and attention of Parliament; and therefore he declined voting with either his old friend or the Oppoſition, but moved the Order of the Day. Unqueſtionably this was looked upon as a meaſure of hoſtility towards Mr. Addington, for it conveyed cenſure, though not in expreſs terms; nay, in the declared grounds upon which his conduct was reſted, a degree of cenſure was abſolutely expreſſed. If Mr. Pitt had not wiſhed to be ſo underſtood, if he had really meant to continue that ſupport to Miniſtry which at firſt he had given, and which he was engaged to give, why not negative the motion? The mere negativing of ſuch a motion was no unqualified approbation of Miniſters; he might conſcientiouſly have done it, and yet retained the ſentiments which he profeſſed, upon his merely ſhewing the motion of Mr. Patten was improper; why then be hunting after diſtinctions and qualifications for

for his vote? Surely, in the courſe of his political life, Mr. Pitt muſt have often ſupported his friends in caſes where there was full as much room for ſcruples of conſcience as in this. But indeed it muſt not be forgot, that nothing poſitive was required of him; he was only aſked to join in negativing a motion which, as he himſelf allowed, was in the extent propoſed unfounded, and farther objectionable as being ill-timed.

It is no wonder then if the opinion of men in general was not very favourable to a morality ſo extremely delicate and queſtionable; it drew forth a Philippic (upon peculiar grounds indeed) from Mr. Cobbet, which occaſioned the withdrawing of Mr. Canning from the Firm of the Houſe. But, beſides, perſons of more moderation could not but ſee that this was evidently ſeeking a quarrel with Mr. Addington, and a ſtep towards the total deſertion of that promiſe which had hitherto been kept more "to the "ear" than "to the hope."

But as a juſtification of Mr. Pitt's conduct, and as an impeachment, I ſuppoſe, of the ſincerity of Mr. Addington, we are told that Mr. Pitt* "may have thought differently from Mr. Ad- "dington on points of finance, on foreign af- "fairs, on the communications with Bona-

* Plain Anſwer, p. 52.

 "parte:"

" parte:" that he may " have communicated " theſe opinions, *or at leaſt ſome of them*, to his " Majeſty's Miniſters; and he may have found " that they were either rejected as ill-founded, " or unattended to altogether."—We are told farther, that as to Mr. Pitt's oppoſition on the Property Tax Bill, he had, through the channel of ſome intimate friends, previouſly made known to Mr. Addington the view he had taken of the ſubject, and that he only brought forward his oppoſition when he found his remonſtrance diſregarded.

With regard to the firſt of theſe propoſitions, as it contains no poſitive averment, as we know not which of theſe opinions (for it appears to be only *ſome at leaſt)* were expreſſed, I hardly know what anſwer can be given. I confeſs, however, that in this inſtance alſo, I feel very much tempted to deſire the Gentlemen who wrote the " Plain Anſwer" to be more explicit. I will aſk, will Mr. Long, or any of the Gentlemen who aſſiſt him, undertake to point out any one meaſure of Adminiſtration (particularly as to our foreign affairs), of which Mr. Pitt, previous to the 10th of December, 1802, ever in any manner, or to any perſon, particularly to Mr. Addington, ſtated his diſapprobation?

As to the other of theſe propoſitions it is obſervable, that it was ſuch a regulation as Mr. Pitt

Pitt and Mr. Addington might well have differed upon as friends, if Mr. Pitt could ſo have differed from Mr. Addington. With reſpect to the merits of the queſtion, they are not very material on this point. If I were to allow Mr. Pitt to be more practiſed as a financier than Mr. Addington, I do not know that I ſhould injure the cauſe of the latter, or at all hurt his feelings. The truth is, however, that I have heard many perſons find fault with theſe amendments to the original meaſure, and attribute to them moſt of the difficulty which they find in executing the bill as it now ſtands.

A word more as to this. Mr. Addington's yielding upon this point, is much argued upon as a proof of weakneſs and indeciſion; as if in the firſt inſtance he captiouſly refuſed to yield to Mr. Pitt, though afterwards he found himſelf unable to maintain his point. The fact is, firſt, that Mr. Pitt was irregular in his motion, in the manner in which he brought forward the queſtion: it was, in truth, *he* that was captious. Secondly, Mr. Addington's giving way was *really* occaſioned by the very gentlemen who voted with him againſt Mr. Pitt, and who came to him and urged him to grant the exemptions in favour of the ſmall farmers who compoſed a great part of the yeomanry. After all, is it for Mr. Pitt or his friends to take the modification

of

of a tax as a proof of weakneſs? Have they forgot the numberleſs inſtances of the kind by which Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration ſeemed as it were to be diſtinguiſhed? Taxes, propoſed, withdrawn, modified, relinquiſhed, reduced, extended, enacted, and repealed? Shop tax, maid-ſervants' tax, glove tax, and how many other taxes? Mr. Sheridan, ſo early as 1792, (Feb. 17,) characteriſed that adminiſtration, as one that "went on arming and diſarming, taxing and untaxing; who committed ſo many "blunders, that they were for ever making "atonement; who broke our heads that they "might give us a plaiſter."

As to what is ſaid in another place of Mr. Pitt's diſapproving of the ſtatement given by Mr. Addington of our finances, no great ſtreſs will be laid upon that by thoſe who remember the different ſtatements brought before Parliament from year to year, by different financiers, in abſolute oppoſition to each other, yet all of them plauſible, and not eaſy to be confuted.

I cannot, however, diſmiſs this without one obſervation. If Mr. Addington's ſtatement of the 10th of December, 1802, was wrong, why has it not been contradicted? Mr. Gregor, a friend of Mr. Pitt's, gave notice of a motion on the ſubject and abandoned it. No attempt has been made to invalidate it in the only regular way.

way. But, ſays the " Plain Anſwer," " Mr. " Pitt may have thought it of little avail to " reviſe or to comment upon a ſtatement made " in contemplation of peace, when war had " been declared." Indeed ! Do financial ſtatements then change their nature according to circumſtances ? Is this Mr. Pitt's doctrine ? I ſhould have thought that if the ſtatement was erroneous, the declaration of war only increaſed the propriety, nay, the neceſſity of its being rectified. Surely the call for new burthens only made it more requiſite to aſcertain the true extent and effect of the old. This is, indeed, mere evaſion. If only ſuch arguments are brought forward, we may indeed well give ſome credit to the " Near Obſerver," in his ſuggeſtion that " Mr. Addington's ability and ſuc- " ceſs" conſtitute the whole of his crime in the eyes of Mr. Pitt and his friends.

After all, the point moſt material to the preſent queſtion is, whether the manner in which Mr. Pitt brought forward his oppoſition to the meaſure does not ſhew a departure from the ſyſtem of ſupport upon which he ſet out. I neither join with the Near Obſerver in all that he has ſaid of Mr. Pitt's oppoſition, nor can I allow to the other gentleman, what he would have underſtood, that Mr. Addington's not following Mr. Pitt's advice or intimation, afforded a juſt

a juſt cauſe for hoſtility. And indeed, how might all this tend to confirm the opinion advanced by ſome perſons, of Mr. Pitt's expecting that he ſhould govern under the name of Mr. Addington, when we find ſo much ſtreſs laid on Mr. Addington's retaining his own ſentiments in preference to Mr. Pitt's. Obſerve too, how Mr. Pitt's ideas upon this weighty ſubject were communicated—through the channel of third perſons—" intimate friends," it is ſaid: but were not Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington intimate friends? And how ceaſed that intimacy? Why not communicate directly? I will add, can a meaſure of finance, which is in its nature complicated, be diſcuſſed through third perſons? After all, why could they not, as I have ſaid before, retain each their particular ſentiments without offence? In all this, one ſees a jealouſy and diſtruſt which on the face of it is ſuſpicious, one may trace the precautions taken beforehand to prepare a juſtification for his conduct, which all ſtrongly ſpeak a deliberate intention in Mr. Pitt of withdrawing his ſupport, of breaking off his old connections. This was indeed but what I had foreſeen and mentioned. From the moment that Mr. Pitt could bring himſelf to ſtipulate for the advancement of Lord Grenville, at the expence of Mr. Addington's honour and reputation, it was plain, that from that moment, he would

would ceaſe to look upon Mr. Addington as his friend. He muſt feel that he had treated him as no friend ſhould treat another; and after that, the progreſs is almoſt inevitable to reſerve, diſtruſt, averſion, and laſtly, open hoſtility.

With regard to thoſe other opinions of Mr. Pitt, which he may or may not have communicated to Mr. Addington, they have probably ſome connection with what I am now proceeding to conſider, that is, the charges which are brought againſt the preſent miniſters, and how far they are decent or proper in the mouths of thoſe from whom they come.

I ſpeak this, be it obſerved, more particularly as to our foreign relations: for, as I before remarked, as to our internal government, no man will ſay but that it goes on full as ſmoothly as under Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration; nay, it is notorious that, happily for Mr. Addington and the country, it meets with much leſs obſtruction.

We come then to thoſe great meaſures of external polity which have ſo provoked the indignation of Lord Grenville and Lord Spencer, or Mr. Windham and Mr. Cobbett, not forgetting Mr. Canning and a few others of Mr. Pitt's friends.

The firſt of thoſe, and the root of all, is the Preliminary Treaty: for it was from that time that a ſyſtematic and determined oppoſition was

not only entered into by Lord Grenville, but ſolemnly declared and avowed by him, and that in the moſt formal and pointed manner.

I may well claim to be impartial in this reſpect, becauſe I ſcruple not to ſay that I was not one of the many who approved of it; that, at the time, I could moſt heartily have wiſhed it had not been made; although, as to my own private intereſts nothing could be more convenient, yet I ſolemnly declare, that I have, ſince that, had abundant reaſon to doubt the goodneſs of my judgment; that, with all that has been ſaid by oppoſition againſt it, with the renewal of the war which has followed, I do now think that it has been a beneficial meaſure to the country. I will even advance what may appear to many perſons a paradox: I do think that all that acceſſion of territory and ſeeming power which has been acquired by Bonaparte, and which yet is unequal to the ſatisfying of his rapacity, all his ſucceſsful encroachments and uſurpations, ſince the firſt of October, 1801, have added little or nothing to the ſtability of republican *France*. They have increaſed the terror and hatred of the Nations; they have taken off even the tattered remnants of that hypocriſy, by which, at the beginning of the Revolution theſe pretended ſons of liberty covered their real deſigns; and though at this moment the whole

Continent

Continent ſeems cowering under the talons of this ſpoiler, it only waits for the firſt reverſe, for perhaps the failure of the expedition againſt this country, to riſe up with increaſed vengeance againſt that power which is now ſo openly declared the common enemy of mankind.

I do not ſay that theſe are or were events to be ſpeculated upon, ſo as to influence the miniſtry to give away what they might ſafely have retained. It may be, I will admit it, for the ſake of the argument; and as a Chriſtian, I even rejoice in the admiſſion (the more ſo, as it is big with hope for the future) that this is all the working of Providence for its own wiſe ends; and that nothing of it entered into the calculations of human wiſdom. But when things have turned out well, (and, whatever Mr. Windham may ſay, they have turned out well) it is not uſual to quarrel with thoſe who have brought it about.

In this reſpect let me explain myſelf. I ſhould have thought the peace a perfectly good one if we had retained Malta. But, according to the beſt of my obſervation, much the majority of the kingdom would have been greatly diſſatisfied if we had continued the war for that object only. Now, we are in poſſeſſion of that moſt important acquiſition, with the conduct of miniſters in that

reſpect fully juſtified in the eyes of the nation at large.

And this leads me to conſider the principal and moſt important advantage which the peace has procured for us. It has produced ſuch an unanimity in the country; has been the cauſe of ſuch general and wonderful exertions, as I believe, no other circumſtance could or would have brought about. And they are exertions of ſuch a ſort, that the effect of them will not end with the occaſion which brought them forth; but they will ſtand a monument to poſterity of the ability of this country to repel every attack, and to look with indifference upon every threat of invaſion.

Here let me go back once more, to the "Projet" at Liſle. It was, upon its failure, declared by the then miniſters, that they were glad it had failed; but that they had been led into it by the wiſhes which then prevailed in the nation for peace. Let it be obſerved then, that they adopted a meaſure, which in their better judgment they thought wrong, out of mere deference to the popular cry; and let that weigh ſomething when next Mr. Cobbett or Mr. Windham declaim about the neceſſity of government leading the ſenſe of the country, and not being led by it. But now, that the cry for peace, if more loud, was not more general, in 1797 than

in

in 1801, I diſtinctly aver, and hope to make plain, the only difference is, that in 1797, Mr. Fox (Mr. Windham's honourable friend, as he is returned to be,) vented his clamours in Parliament; whereas, in 1801 they were confined to the Whig Club, and ſuch ſeminaries of ſedition and diſaffection.

If then, the ſame motives exiſted for negociating in 1801 as in 1797, if the terms in either caſe were ſo little different, as at leaſt to require ſome ſubtlety to diſtinguiſh materially between them, is there any cauſe for ſuch violent and loud clamour, for ſuch unqualified abuſe, as the preſent miniſtry have on that account incurred? May we not rather ſay, that in the motives which led to it, as well as in other reſpects, the "Projet" at Liſle, is a precedent in point for the Treaty of Amiens?

Let me now ſay a word as to the deſire of peace which prevailed in 1801, and which grew up into a ſtrong expectation upon Mr. Addington's coming into power. Somehow or other the idea had got about, that he was a likely man to accompliſh that object. I ſhall firſt obſerve, that the declarations made by the laſt miniſters, of their rejoicing at the failure of the Treaty at Liſle, had given ſome grounds for people, otherwiſe not well intentioned towards them, to tax them with inſincerity. I ſay not that there was any

real

real ground for this; but ſo it was: and certainly it was generally apprehended that it was not likely they would turn their thoughts that way, or that the enemy would readily treat with them. The acceſſion of a new miniſter was therefore conſidered as auguring favourably for the return of peace; and I deſire only to appeal to the papers of that day, and even to the *Porcupine*, for that fact. Hardly a paper came out that had not ſome conjecture on the ſubject; and Mr. Cobbett took particular pains (pains which cannot otherwiſe be accounted for) to point out what kind of peace alone ought to be made.

Need I appeal to what paſſed on the ſigning of the preliminaries? Conſider only thoſe demonſtrations of joy which extorted ſuch bitter Philippics in Cobbett's Regiſter, againſt the "peace-loving people of England." In that publication language has been almoſt exhauſted in invectives againſt the people for their approbation of the peace: even very lately it ſtated nine-tenths of the people to be devoted to that ſide of the queſtion.* But let us alſo conſider what paſſed afterwards, and we ſhall ſee further and more unequivocal proofs, that nothing

* This was ſo manifeſt, that Lord Temple himſelf, probably becauſe as a county member, he did not think it quite ſafe at once to contradict the opinions of his conſtituents, in the firſt inſtance, gave his aſſent to the preliminaries.

could

could be more decided than the cry of the nation for peace. In the interval between the Preliminaries and Definitive Treaty, Bonaparte poſſeſſed himſelf of the iſland of Elba, procured himſelf to be elected Preſident of the Ciſalpine Republic, and took other meaſures for his aggrandizement. Did thoſe circumſtances, which undoubtedly would have warranted a renewal of the war, produce any change in the public opinion? Was the miniſtry called upon to break off the negociation? By no means. Peace was ſtill deſired, and, when it came, was received with joy. But let us go further ſtill: when the peace was concluded, Bonaparte went on extending his power; other territories were added to his empire, and even his deſigns againſt this country began to unfold themſelves; did, even then, the nation call for war? Not a voice was heard, not a ſyllable to that effect, except from thoſe who had been in the conſtant habit of oppoſing the treaty. But this is not all: after the full manifeſtation of Bonaparte's hoſtile (nay, irreconcilably hoſtile) ſpirit to this country, have we not ſeen Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox join together in urging miniſters to enter again into treaty, under the mediation of Ruſſia? Yes, I ſay, and after this Mr. Pitt can talk of improper conceſſions to Bonaparte!!!

Theſe are ſtrong proofs, and be it obſerved, that

that I adduce them only as proofs, unqueſtionable proofs, how decided and how general was the wiſh of the nation for peace. If to ſuch a wiſh, ſo plainly and ſo loudly pronounced, it was a weakneſs in the preſent miniſters to give way, (and whether it was or not, I am not now arguing) ſtill it little becomes thoſe perſons to exclaim ſo ſtrongly againſt their conduct, to mark it with ſuch virulent abuſe, who themſelves, in the caſe of the "Projet" at Liſle, who in another inſtance, which I ſhall preſently notice, and one of the greateſt importance, themſelves ſet the example of yielding, not to the expreſſion only, but even to the apprehenſion of a ſimilar wiſh?

And this leads me to conſider the charges which have lately been made againſt miniſters for not having met the hoſtile ſpirit of Bonaparte, in a ſufficiently ſpirited manner. It has even been ſaid, that the war might have been avoided by a different conduct. As to this laſt propoſition, I cannot perſuade myſelf that it is urged ſeriouſly; if it be believed by any one, I am ſure that I ſhould think it in vain to argue with ſuch a man, upon any point which is connected with the meaſures of Bonaparte. No man, I muſt think, can ſeriouſly believe it; for in precipitating the war, even when he did, it is plain enough that he acted contrary to his own intereſt.

intereſt. The ſame irritabilility and violence of ambition, if it had been met by equal irritability and violence, or even (let it be ſaid) more decided oppoſition, would only have produced the war ſo much ſooner, without perhaps the ſame unanimity in the country to encounter it. With what grace, indeed, this imputation can be caſt againſt miniſters by thoſe, who, during the whole period that peace continued, were unceaſingly inculcating the abſolute neceſſity of war, let the conſiſtent Mr. Cobbett explain.

But how, if the peace had been prolonged? Would our ſituation have been mended? Not a jot, according to theſe very gentlemen. Not a jot, I believe, every body now will ſay, after what has come out of the diſpoſition and deſigns of Bonaparte. Could he have diſſembled but a few months, he would have been in poſſeſſion of Malta. Does any body believe that, once in poſſeſſion of that, he would have delayed his deſigns upon Egypt, or abandoned that ſyſtem of hoſtilities, which he could not help anticipating in the publication of Sebaſtiani's miſſion, even at the riſk of loſing that iſland?

As for my own part, I profeſs not to have ſeen, not to ſee now, in the papers which have been publiſhed, that "manner" on the part of our miniſters, "which was more likely to encourage and to incite, than to counteract and

" reſiſt, the hoſtile ſpirit of Bonaparte."* The conduct and language of our government appeared to me, not the leſs dignified for being uniformly moderate and guarded. The fact is, the experiment of peace was made; (all peace unfortunately, in our days more eſpecially, is but experiment, and this being with ſo novel a government, muſt be peculiarly ſo) the experiment then being made, it was to have a fair trial. Adminiſtration, therefore, was not to make every irregular or improper demand of Bonaparte an occaſion of war: but theſe demands were reſiſted with firmneſs, and, I will ſay, with dignity. Had thoſe nations, whoſe intereſts were more particularly affected by it, been diſpoſed to aſſiſt the Swiſs, it is clear that our miniſters would not have been backward; and they ſufficiently ſhewed what they would have done, had the proper occaſion preſented itſelf. But to have gone to war for Switzerland, when its liberties were actually gone, and with all the powers of the Continent acquieſcing in the uſurpations of Bonaparte, might have been very chivalrous and gallant, but would not have been thought very wiſe: nor do I know that this reaſoning, if good, when applied to Switzerland, will be bad when applied to Piedmont, or to any other the encroachments of France, on either Continent.

* Plain Anſwer, p. 52.

I will

I will go farther. I do think that the temper and forbearance of miniſters, during the courſe of the negociation, are inſtances of real and ſolid wiſdom on their part. Contemplating, as they muſt have done, the almoſt certain return of war, it was of moſt eſſential conſequence that they ſhould appear to the people of this country not to have been the cauſe of even haſtening its approach; that by no intemperance of language or of meaſures, they ſhould give any handle for doubting of their ſincerity, as to the maintenance of peace. Now to have been able to endure, not only the irritating conduct of the French government, but the violent reproaches and variety of abuſe which was caſt upon them in this country, on account of their ſuppoſed abject ſubmiſſion to Bonaparte, ſhews a firmneſs and conſtancy of mind, which is a moſt prominent, and perhaps the moſt difficult, part of wiſdom. Weak minds are eaſily irritated; they are impatient of obloquy, however unmerited, and that irritability and impatience diſables them from waiting for, or making the proper uſe of ſuch favourable circumſtances as are not immediately preſent.

Thoſe who are old enough, may remember what advantage Mr. Pitt derived from ſimilar forbearance, at his firſt entrance into office in 1782. He ſtood the brunt of Mr. Fox's oppo-

 ſition,

ſition, of all his Philippics and violent motions, backed by a majority of the Houſe of Commons, to the great hindrance even of public buſineſs: he ſtood it apparently unmoved; nor would he (though preſſed by the Grenville's to do it) diſſolve the Parliament, until the moment came that, by his perſeverance, he had broken Mr. Fox's majorities, and ſaw the great body of the nation heartily and decidedly with him.

This is not the time, nor is there room now, for a laboured defence of miniſtry, upon all the points, upon which they have been attacked; but ſome notice muſt be taken of that other head, upon which the "More Accurate Obſerver" has reſted in making Mr. Pitt's apology. That gentleman, he ſays, "*may* have thought "that the neceſſary ſteps to conciliate foreign "powers had been omitted, that alliances had "been neglected."* It might have been well if Mr. Pitt's apologiſt had been ſo good as to tell us what foreign powers he means, what alliances he alludes to. One would ſuppoſe that there was ſomething in the conduct of the war, when carried on by Mr. Pitt, which ſhewed that there was no difficulty in all this, that the circumſtances of the Continent were ſuch, as to be at leaſt favourable to the making of ſuch connec-

* Plain Anſwer, p. 52.

tions.

tions. One would be led to think at leaſt, that ſome of theſe foreign powers had been alienated, ſome alliances broken, ſince Mr. Pitt went out of office. But now, what is the fact? Even in the *Porcupine*,* the paper of the outrageous Mr. Cobbett, the ſtate of the country at the time, when Mr. Addington came into adminiſtration, was repreſented to be ſuch that, according to him, "we appeared, as it were, a nation devoted "to deſtruction;" "deſerted by our allies, the "world combining or combined againſt us."

I ſhall be told, perhaps, that this is taking Cobbett at a diſadvantage. Like Benedict in the play, when he ſpoke too much in favour of Mr. Addington, "he did not think that he "ſhould live to be in oppoſition." But let us hear what a correſpondent of his, in the Political Regiſter, and one whoſe opinions he refers to with great commendations, has told us, only ſo late as the end of July laſt: ſpeaking of the laſt war, he ſays, "During the courſe of it, we loſt "our allies, one after another. The King of "Pruſſia moſt baſely forſook us. The Dutch, "moſt fatally for their intereſt and indepen- "dence, threw themſelves into the arms of "France. Spain, after a few feeble efforts, "joined the conqueror. The intrigues of the

* See Porcupine of April 20, 1801.

"Italian

" Italian powers vaniſhed before French fero-
" city. Some of the ſmaller ſtates had been
" blotted out of exiſtence, and others have riſen
" upon their ruins. Ruſſia, after making a con-
" ſiderable impreſſion upon France, withdrew
" from the common alliance, and was only pre-
" vented by the ſudden death of her ſovereign
" from turning her arms againſt us. And the
" Emperor of Germany, our only valuable and
" beſt-tried ally, forced by a train of defeats, to
" conclude a treaty in which we were not com-
" prehended. Thus, after a ſeries of events,
" which have no parallel, partly occaſioned by
" ill-judged policy, perfidy, and weakneſs, on
" the one hand; and by a ſpirit of enthu-
" ſiaſm, ambition, irreſiſtible power, and aſto-
" niſhing ſucceſs on the other, we found our-
" ſelves deſerted by our allies, and left to main-
" tain the combat alone."

When we conſider that all theſe events, all this deſertion, took place during Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration, backed by all the fortitude and all the wiſdom of Lord Grenville, I would aſk what reaſon have either of theſe gentlemen to impute to the preſent miniſtry our want of allies? Have they ſhewn us an example how alliances are to be preſerved, much leſs how they are to be recovered?

The truth is, and they know it, the whole Continent

Continent is now baſely crouching and trembling at the feet of Bonaparte. The different powers will do any thing rather than provoke him. I except not the North of Germany; for how elſe would Bonaparte have ventured to enter into that quarter with his armies, and to lay waſte one of the members of the German Empire, but the other day guaranteed as ſuch, not merely by the Emperor of Germany and Pruſſia, but even by the Emperor of Ruſſia? Would it be endured by any potentates but ſuch as are wholly loſt to a ſenſe of honour, as well as blind to their real intereſts, that this uſurper ſhould levy contributions upon, and dictate terms to independent cities and ſtates, at their very doors? That he ſhould occupy the banks of their rivers, and controul their navigation? What is to be expected from nations or ſovereigns ſo devoid of every generous feeling? I was witneſs to ſomething of the kind, even during the laſt war. Even then, the whole Continent was French, and ſpoke the language, I ſhould ſay the jargon, and ſentiments of France; Auſtria, perhaps, excepted; but the evil had not then riſen to quite ſuch an alarming height; they were not then abſolutely pinioned and gagged.

Of courſe, after this, I need hardly take notice of the terrible apprehenſions brought forward by the "Accurate Obſerver, that the whole Con-

"tinent

" tinent looks upon the caſe" of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, " as decidedly againſt us." Poor ſouls! would they venture to expreſs a different opinion? Is, however, this defender of Mr. Pitt aware, that if the opinion of this ſame Continent be taken, we ſhall as decidedly be conſtituted the aggreſſors in the laſt war? And will he lay ſtreſs upon ſuch opinions? Is it to ſuch judges as thoſe that he appeals?

The opinion which is of real conſequence to this country, which alone can ſave or deſtroy it, is the *opinion of the people* themſelves; and I have ſhewn above, that by the wiſdom and firmneſs of adminiſtration this has been ſo ſecured, the minds of every Britiſh ſubject have been ſo united, as to procure us the moſt ample ſecurity, as to remove from us almoſt the poſſibility of danger.

I impute it not to the laſt miniſtry as a fault, that they could not retain their allies. I am not ſure that in their then temper and diſpoſition they were worth retaining; but I do impute it to them and their partiſans, that they ſhould make it a ground of attack againſt miniſters, that they have not done that, which they themſelves could not accompliſh; that they have not recovered what was, in fact, loſt by their predeceſſors.

And yet, amidſt all this, ſomething has been done

done by miniſters; and whatever may be ſaid of the late treaty with Sweden, yet one would think that that cannot be ſo very bad for us, which Bonaparte finds not to be good for him.* Yet there is a proſpect of Ruſſia feeling ſome ſhame for her ſupineneſs. Yet, while Hamburgh and Lubeck have been ſhut up, other channels for our commerce have been opened.

Let me now come to the tranſaction which I before hinted at, and let me in my turn (ſince in ſelf-defence we muſt be critics alſo,) let me inquire a little more particularly into the claims of the late adminiſtration to ſuperior wiſdom and vigour in their negociations with foreign powers. I ſhall carry back my reader to a period, it may be ſaid, ſomewhat remote; it is, however, what, I believe, has had more influence upon the conduct of Pruſſia, and has contributed to its baſe deſertion, and the turn which affairs have taken in the North, more than all that this miniſtry has done, or could do, if they were even as wicked and fooliſh as Cobbett repreſents them to be. The reaſons why ſo little ſtreſs has been laid upon it, why it has been paſſed over in comparative ſilence, I will preſently ſhew.

What I allude to is the Ruſſian armament in 1791. Will it be believed, that this ſame admi-

* See Moniteur of

ſtration, which is cried up as ſo excluſively wiſe and penetrating, and, above all, ſo firm and vigorous, ſhould not only have expoſed itſelf to abſolute deriſion and contempt, but committed a deliberate breach of faith? That it ſhrunk from engagements which it had contracted, out of pure fear leſt a War ſhould be unpopular, leſt (ſhall I ſay it?) a clamour for Peace might ſhake them in their ſeats? What ſhall we ſay to their ſuffering his Majeſty's Miniſter at a foreign Court to be elbowed, to be laughed at, to be completely put down by the Envoy of a Faction, ſent to that Court, and received by it in profeſſed oppoſition to the Counſels of our Sovereign.

Every Engliſhman will eaſily enter into the feelings of Lord Whitworth on this occaſion. Never was mortification more complete. He had, by direction from our Court, held the moſt high and threatening language, and proteſted that War would be the immediate conſequence of his Remonſtrances not being attended to. Relying, however, upon the aſſurances given by *the Gentlemen on the other ſide*, the Ruſſian Cabinet ſtood firm; and our great, our mighty, our vigorous Negotiators gave way. They did, indeed, ſhew ſome delicacy for Lord Whitworth; they did put it in his power to ſhut himſelf up, as he did, for ſix weeks; and ſent Mr. Faulkener to make their apology to the Empress, and aſ-

ſure

ſure her, I ſuppoſe, of their readineſs to receive her future commands.

Mr. Fox and his friends, backed by Mr. Wilberforce, will, perhaps, ſtill inſiſt that Ochakoff was not an object for which we ought to go to war. Be it ſo; but where then was the wiſdom of Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt to commit the Country for ſuch an object? Or why perſiſt in it till they involved the Nation in high diſgrace?

The fact is, and, though not generally known, it is now no ſecret,* that our interpoſition reſpecting Ochakoff, was only part of a ſyſtem concerted with the late King of Pruſſia, for the expreſs purpoſe of preventing the partition of Poland. Moſt certain it is, and it was the opinion of Staniſlaus himſelf,† that it was owing to Mr. Fox's oppoſition that he was ſtripped of his kingdom.

In retracting as we did, we left nothing for Pruſſia to do, but to take her part of the ſpoil: we gave her alſo an example of deſertion, upon which ſhe has amply improved.

All this applies with particular force to Lord Grenville. For let it be remembered, that the actual reaſon of that Noble Lord's coming into office was the refuſal of the late Duke of Leeds

* See Dodſley's Annual Regiſter for 1791.

† See alſo Eton's Survey of the Turkiſh Empire, 2d Edit. p. 436, 437.

to accede to this ſhameful and ignominious retractation. That Noble Duke had too much of the ſpirit of an Engliſhman to ſet his hand to diſpatches which would ſo eſſentially tarniſh the reputation of his Country. He would not "ſay and ſtraight unſay." That was left for the then prudent, and pliant, and ſubmiſſive, but now, above all, firm and vigorous, and magnanimous, Lord Grenville. Under ſuch auſpices did his Lordſhip enter into the Cabinet. Thus did he commence his career as Miniſter!

The reaſon why this diſgraceful buſineſs has been in a manner huſhed, is plain. Miniſters felt that it was not honourable to them; and the Oppoſition muſt have been equally conſcious that a near examination into their conduct not only would not turn to their credit, but might affect their perſonal ſafety.*

* This, however, they did not immediately diſcover, or they truſted to the puſillanimity of Miniſters. For one cannot but ſmile to ſee the "Piſtols" and the "Nyms" of theſe times, not only kicked at the Court of Ruſſia, but ſpit upon in the Houſe of Commons, inſulted by the very man who had brought this diſgrace upon them. "What Court," (ſaid Mr. Fox, ſpeaking of the Miniſters, in December 14, 1792) "What Court, he would aſk, would be elevated by their pro-"miſes, or intimidated by their menaces, after their timid "conduct with reſpect to Ruſſia?" This to be ſure was a long while ago; and now, in 1804, Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville may, I ſuppoſe, notwithſtanding all this form a Coalition.

It

It paſſed off, therefore, in this Country very quietly; but the effect of it abroad was long felt; and I verily believe that it has had an influence upon all the events which have of late years taken place in the North of Europe.

If then Lord Grenville, and Mr. Wyndham, if Mr. Pitt's friends, will ſtill upbraid the preſent Adminiſtration for want of firmneſs, of wiſdom, of talent, for having made an inglorious Peace; I fear not to challenge a compariſon; and to defy them to ſhew me any thing in the laſt Peace half ſo inglorious, ſo diſgraceful as this. Let any impartial perſon pronounce by which of the two tranſactions the national honour has been moſt tarniſhed. It will be found at leaſt, if all that they ſay were true, that this Adminiſtration is not the only one that has yielded up the true intereſt, the glory of this country, to popular clamour, to the deſire (if they make the accuſation, unjuſt as it is, it muſt be retorted) of keeping their places.

When Lord Grenville next quarrels with the late or any future Northern Convention, let him be reminded what a noble opportunity then preſented itſelf, and was thrown away, of making the Empreſs renounce all her ſchemes to the detriment of this country, of diſſolving for ever every veſtige of that armed neutrality which was ſo ungenerouſly raiſed up againſt this country in the

the hour of her embarraſſment, at a moment when we dared not reſiſt. Being, as we were, at peace with other countries in 1791, ſhe could not have ſtood a moment againſt us. From that conteſt, ſingle handed, the firmneſs of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville ſhrunk back: they preferred even national diſgrace: and now they modeſtly require the higheſt poſſible tone to be held when all the world is in a manner united againſt us.

That, however, we ſhall not long be without allies, I verily believe. The nations upon the Continent will very ſoon ſee the neceſſity of flying for refuge to that power, which alone has reſiſted the attacks, as well direct as indirect, of France. But after all that has paſſed, it is their buſineſs to come to us, and not ours to go to them. I believe that any appearance of eagerneſs on our part will rather retard than accelerate that general confederacy, which yet, perhaps, is not very diſtant. Let us not therefore ſolicit, not only the mediation of Ruſſia (Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt muſt both excuſe me), but not even her alliance. To ſhew that we have a proper ſenſe of our importance, will only make us the more ſought after. Such is human nature and human politics.

When, however, the time ſhall again recur to treat for Peace, let me hope that we ſhall all be of one mind; that the whole Nation will ſee the good

good policy as well as juſtice of retaining ſuch conqueſts as may be not only eſſential to our ſecurity, but even of acknowledged advantage:* that we ſhall not ſuffer ourſelves to be influenced by the intereſted or partial repreſentations of thoſe ſtates who have tamely or ſelfiſhly left us to bear "the heat and burthen of the day," and would after that invidiouſly ſtrip us of our earnings. Let them feel, that ſince they have obliged this Country to aſcertain the extent of her powers, her ability to ſtand by herſelf, it is not for them to ſet bounds to her efforts, or limits to her acquiſitions.

That our preſent Miniſters are as likely to atchieve this as any of thoſe who are loudeſt in abuſe againſt them, is what, I think, I have ſhewn to be at leaſt probable. Some credit, I think, will be given them for vigour, by thoſe who conſider the blockade of the Elbe, the alarm which has been ſpread on the coaſts of the enemy, our recaptures in the Weſt Indies, and troops ſent out, in the face of an army aſſembled on the oppoſite coaſt for the declared purpoſe of invaſion, in ſuch numbers and with ſuch means as have never before been witneſſed. I will ſay,

* It is not the laſt Peace that gives the firſt example of this Country reſtoring, from a miſplaced generoſity or a too great deſire of peace, Conqueſts which, perhaps, ought to have been retained. Our hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances.

and

and I am ſure it will be hereafter acknowledged, that not only in this Country, but in any other, never have ſuch ſtrong exertions been made in the firſt year of a war. After all the calumnies which have been advanced reſpecting the ſtate of our fleets and our armies, regular and irregular, it is now found that our ſhips are in want of nothing, our regular army far from neglected, and our irregular force marſhalled in ſuch numbers, and in ſuch a ſtate of diſcipline, as are fully adequate to the occaſion. To enter into detail would require a volume; but I am perſuaded, and indeed it appears plainly enough, that, let Gentlemen ſay what they will, the Country feels that it is not defenceleſs; it is ready to declare that good proviſion has been made, that good proviſion is making for its protection, and for the aſſertion of its dignity and rank among Nations.

Among the accuſations repeatedly made and repelled, is, that of Miniſters having improvidently diſarmed at the Peace, and left the Country defenceleſs. We are told too of their having held out expectations of Peace which were fallacious: but let any man look back to the debates in Parliament, to the Journals, he will find the fact to be, that not a man of the infantry (except foreigners) was diſbanded, whom Miniſters thought they could keep without a breach of good faith. From the very beginning, they prepared

pared the Country for an eſtabliſhment unuſually great. From the Journals of Parliament it will appear, that in fact our Peace Eſtabliſhment was kept up to a height beyond all compariſon. Contraſt this (I would not wiſh to make the contraſt, but it is forced upon me); contraſt this with Mr. Pitt's conduct in 1792; the conduct of that man who is declared to be the only man capable of ſaving the Country.* In February 1792, when the train was actually laid which was to ſet fire to the four corners of Europe, he diſbands ſoldiers, leſſens the number of our ſeamen, he repeals taxes; he declares that "the moment of anxiety and ſolicitude is paſt;" that the Nation was at that time as likely to enjoy Peace for the period to which he looked forward *(fifteen years)* as at any time it had ever been. Is this the wiſdom, the foreſight, the blaze of ſunſhine, which quite puts out the feebler lights of the preſent Adminiſtration?

It remains for me now only to notice an accuſation againſt Mr. Addington, of the moſt invidious caſt; which I would willingly have paſſed over, if it were not even now preſſed with the moſt obſtinate perſeverance. He is ſaid to have appropriated to himſelf the wealth of the Nation:

* One can hardly forbear exclaiming—

When was it known, that Rome ſo great in arms,
That her wide walls encompaſs'd but one man?

to be greedy of place, to have enriched and aggrandized his family. How is the fact? Mr. Addington having ſerved the Public for fifteen years, in ſituations which confer undiſputed claims, and being rather poorer now than when he was elected Speaker, is guilty of having preſented his ſon to a ſinecure place of three thouſand a year. That Mr. Bragge and Mr. Hiley Addington are in place, will hardly, I think, form an accuſation until it be proved (what I apprehend cannot be proved) that they are unfit for their reſpective ſituations. Be it remembered too that both were brought into office by Mr. Pitt.

Let me now go over a catalogue, I believe imperfect, of what is enjoyed by their opponents, by the men whoſe diſintereſtedneſs is oppoſed to his rapacity.

Firſt as to the Grenville's.—Lord Buckingham enjoys a place which produces in war time 18,000l. per annum. Lord Grenville has one of 4000l. per annum, with a contingent penſion (obtained ſince he went out of office) of 1500l. to Lady Grenville. Both have had peerages conferred upon them: ſo have their relations; Lords Braybrooke, Carysford, Glaſtonbury. Mr. Thomas Grenville has a Chief Juſticeſhip in Eyre, worth, I believe, 4000l. per annum.

Now for Mr. Pitt's friends.—Lord Chatham enjoys

enjoys a Parliamentary penſion, with reverſion to Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt has the Wardenſhip of the Cinque Ports. Both theſe moſt honourably earned and well deſerved. But has not Mr. Addington alſo his claims?—Lord Melville, it will not be denied, is amply provided for. I quarrel not with that neither, but ſuch is the fact. The Eliots too, I believe, have not been forgotten.

Come we now to their dependants. Mr. Huſkiſſon is up to the ears in places and emoluments. Mr. Long has a penſion. Mr. Roſe *enjoys in poſſeſſion, with reverſion to his ſon,* a place more lucrative than the Clerkſhip of the Pells. Laſtly, Mr. Canning has his place too; one which, though nominally held during pleaſure, has not been taken from him. But this is not all. His numerous relatives are all provided for; and two ſiſters of his are actually receiving each 500*l.* a year from his Majeſty's Exchequer, at the time when half that ſum cannot be procured for ladies of rank and high family connections.

I have now gone through what I propoſed. I have, I think, ſhewn the futility of the charges brought againſt Mr. Addington. I have ſhewn that he came into office upon as independent grounds as any Miniſter ever did. That throughout he has acted with the utmoſt delicacy, with every feeling of friendſhip towards Mr. Pitt, while he has not met with the return he de-

ſerved. I have ſhewn alſo, and this is the point moſt material for the public, that the charges brought againſt him of incapacity and weakneſs have no foundation in fact, and probably originate in the mere ſpirit of party, if not in ſomething worſe. I have therefore eſtabliſhed a claim for him to a continuance of that confidence which the public actually repoſes in him, and which, if he meets with only the ſame indulgence as was ſhewn to his predeceſſor, he may flatter himſelf that he will not very ſoon forfeit.

To Mr. Pitt I would now addreſs a few words, though I know not how he will receive them. But I have long been uſed to conſider him as a friend; and whatever his feelings may be, I do not find it ſo eaſy to get rid of old attachments. I ſhould never have entered into any criticiſm of any part of his adminiſtration, but for his and his adherents' moſt unfair attacks upon the meaſures of others. It is his conduct that has thrown the weight, not only of friendſhip, but of duty, into the oppoſite ſcale. I would therefore intreat him to diveſt himſelf for a moment of his newly-adopted opinions, of paſſion, and of prejudice. Let him coolly and candidly examine the facts and the reaſonings to which I have called his attention, and let him judge himſelf. Let him ſearch his own heart. If that condemn him not, I ſhall wonder. If it do, let him think

think and act in a manner more worthy of himſelf.

Let him conſider one thing more. We have pamphlets (two at leaſt) avowedly written by his particular friends and adherents. Through the whole of them, the point chiefly laboured and kept in view, is the ſuppoſed incapacity and want of talents of Mr. Addington. To this all the endeavours of the writers ſeem to be directed. To the other members of adminiſtration, ſome degree of ability is allowed. Lord Caſtlereagh, Mr. Yorke, nay even Lord Hawkeſbury, are occaſionally brought forward to receive their ſhare of compliment. But as to Mr. Addington, the conſtant theme is, his utter inability to fill the ſituation in which he is placed. I will not aſk, how this is compatible with the report circulated by Mr. Pitt's friends, that it is to his recommendation that Mr. Addington owes that ſituation, or how they will juſtify a recommendation which they are ſo deſirous of ſhewing to have been utterly improper, becauſe I have ſhewn how little foundation there is for ſuch a report: but I will aſk, is this right? Is this juſt? Is it fair? Is it the treatment which Mr. Addington's conduct has called for at the hands of Mr. Pitt? Is this the manner in which Mr. Addington would have treated Mr. Pitt, if their ſituations had been reverſed?

To

To my readers I may now addreſs a few words. It may be neceſſary in the firſt place for me to ſay, that I took up my pen, and determined upon this publication without any communication with any perſon whatſoever; that the whole of it is entirely my own; and that I would never have written a line of it, had I ſeen any other individual diſpoſed to take that taſk upon himſelf, and had I not thought it of importance to the country, as well as to my friends, that the points which I have touched upon ſhould be rightly underſtood.

I may perhaps, notwithſtanding be ranked in the claſs of party writers; but in the common acceptation of the term, I diſclaim it, and contend that I have a right ſo to do. To ſay that I have written with no predilection, would be to ſay that I am, to a certain degree, incapable of judgment, or culpably indifferent. But what I aſſert is, that I have ſhewn no undue or blind attachment to the ſide in favour of which I have written. Had I not been perſuaded that Mr. Addington's conduct was to be defended upon the cleareſt grounds, with perfect truth and juſtice, not a line of this would have been written. I diſtinctly aver that there is not a ſingle fact adduced by me which is not founded in the ſtricteſt truth: and, if I know what it is to reaſon, I have drawn no partial inference, I have uſed

no

no unfair argument. Such are the claims which I make for myſelf. As far as the name of party writer is incompatible with theſe claims, it does not belong to me. Allow me theſe claims, and it is indifferent to me what I am called.

One word more, and I have done. It is I think, apparent enough that I have even ſtudiouſly abſtained from that, which indeed is my averſion, exceſſive or unmeaning panegyric. I will now however take leave to ſay, becauſe I truſt, I have eſtabliſhed a title to ſay it, that it is my firm perſuaſion, that the time is not far diſtant, when the wiſdom and the vigour of Mr. Addington's adminiſtration will be as apparent and as univerſally acknowledged as its mildneſs, nor will his reputation in that reſpect be leſs ſolid or durable for having been of ſlow growth.

POSTSCRIPT.

UPON looking over once more the "View of "the Relative Situations," I perceive two points brought forward again, upon which I ought to have ſaid ſomething. One of them is a clear miſrepreſentation. It is argued, as if Mr. Addington or his friends had required or expected from Mr. Pitt that he ſhould prevent Mr. Canning from ſpeaking as he did in Parliament. Now nothing can be more unfounded. What

Mr.

Mr. Addington's friends expected from Mr. Pitt, what however they could never obtain from him, was, not that he ſhould put any reſtraint upon Mr. Canning's oratory, but that he ſhould diſavow the ſentiments uttered by that Gentleman: that he ſhould ſay, or give authority to others to ſay, that Mr. Canning was not his repreſentative in Parliament, was not delivering his opinions; which was a miſtake that, owing to Mr. Pitt's ſilence on that head, was actually made by ſome perſons, and hardly kept clear of by others.

The effect produced therefore, however unintentional it *might* be on the part of Mr. Pitt, was certainly ſomething very like what is deſcribed by the "Near Obſerver."

The other point relates wholly to Mr. Canning.—The "Member of Parliament" ſays of him, that "he is known, from the moment that "the late Miniſters reſigned, to have diſap-"proved the choice of their Succeſſors:" that "he proteſted againſt it at the time, and *has con-"tinued his proteſt ever ſince.*" Will this ſame "Member of Parliament" affirm, that Mr. Canning has, *at no time*, retracted his *proteſt*, or repented of his oppoſition; that he has never ſhewn a diſpoſition to take office under Mr. Addington?

FINIS.

Printed by C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Fleet Street.